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Herein I outline a new theory of contract and contract enforcement.  This theory is based 
upon two claims, one positive and one normative. The first claim is that incomplete 
contracting theory fails to explain how economic actors govern production in the new 
economy.  Theories of “pragmatic governance” do, however, capture how modern firms 
order their relationships.  To support this first claim, evidence from collaborative 
contracts is presented.  The second claim is that, because both the traditional contextualist 
and the ascendant neoformalist approaches to contract enforcement undermine this new 
form of contract, a new philosophy is needed.  A hybrid approach, integrating both 
formalism and problem-solving judicial intervention, provides such an alternative. 
                                                 
1 JD, Columbia University School of Law, 2007; MSc, London School of Economics, 2004; BA with 
Honors, Brigham Young University, 2002.  The author, who welcomes comments, can be contacted via 
email at matthew.jennejohn “at” columbia.edu.   
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I. Introduction 
How is production governed in a capitalist economy?2  For over 100 years, the 
answer to that question has been “the firm.”3  That argument, however, has become 
problematic as firms have de-integrated over the last quarter century.4  Whereas the 
production process was formally governed through ownership—i.e. integration of 
production within a single firm5—production is governed increasingly through contract.  
Outsourcing exemplifies this recent phenomenon.   When spinning-off ancillary 
production units, companies do not, however, enter into arms-length contracts with their 
former subsidiary, now supplier.  This is not a return to pre-industrial economic 
organization.  Rather, they enmesh themselves in webs of collaboration—joint ventures, 
strategic alliances, just-in-time (JIT) production arrangements, etc.—usually in hope of 
cost-cutting but also with an eye to securing competitive advantage through innovation.   
These complex relationships stretch traditional conceptions of both contract and 
corporation.  Thus, this paper’s research question: how do parties govern these innovative 
collaborations?6 
                                                 
2 Ronald Coase was the first to ask the question, at least theoretically, in his seminal 1937 article.  Coase, 
Ronald, “The Nature of the Firm,” 16 Economica 386 (1937). 
3 Defining “firm” theoretically has always been problematic—indeed that was the puzzle at the heart of 
Coase’s article. Id. at 387 (“searching for a definition of the firm” being the article’s question).  Chandler 
takes a descriptive approach to the problem: “Modern business enterprise is easily identified…. [I]t has two 
specific characteristics: it contains many distinct operating units and it is managed by a hierarchy of 
salaried executives.”  Chandler, Alfred, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN 
BUSINESS 1 (1977).  In the United States, the “firm” become more or less synonymous with the 
“corporation.”  Berle, Adolph A. and Gardiner Means, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY, 1st edition 13-17 (1932). 
4 These developments are discussed more fully in Part II below. 
5 Or conglomerate—the distance between the ultimate owner and production is immaterial.  The point is the 
control mechanism: property.  The sole proprietor controls his cornerstore and the far-flung multi-national 
controls its subsidiaries through the same mechanism: the prerogatives of ownership (not contract). 
6 It is important to note that the question asked here is different from the question asked by Coase and his 
progeny.  Coase’s original question can be summarized as “why firms?”  Because collaboration, which he 
rightly assumed to amount to contracting, is costly, Coase argued that the firm was a mechanism for 
reducing transaction costs.  Coase, supra note 1.  His students have mostly focused on the boundaries of the 
firm: i.e. they look to understand that threshold where contracting becomes so costly that individuals will 
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Parties govern their collaborations by building pragmatic governance mechanisms 
into their contracts.  I.e. when the uncertainties inherent in innovation render traditional 
incentive-based contract terms hopelessly incomplete, parties use a new type of 
commitment device, based upon pragmatic principles, to reign in opportunism.  Peer 
review of joint experimentation governs where control rights prove too clumsy.  
Collaborators’ use of pragmatic governance has been identified before, by Charles Sabel 
and colleagues, through scrutiny of production processes and firm strategy;7 however, no 
research has yet analyzed the actual contracts involved.8  This article fills that gap.  Using 
agreements made public through collaborators’ SEC filings, this paper finds evidence that 
parties are including pragmatic governance mechanisms in their contracts.  This empirical 
conclusion, supported by a theoretical discussion that challenges alternative explanations, 
comprises this article’s first claim. 
A second claim concerns enforcement of the new agreements by courts. Third 
party adjudication—through arbitration, mediation, and/or litigation—plays a significant 
role in enforcing these contracts (though self-enforcement does occur).  However, 
judicial adjudication also plays an important role in resolving disputes between 
                                                                                                                                                 
use ownership to govern the relationship.  The question here is different: rather than asking why the 
boundary of the firm is where it is, this paper asks how economic actors govern as that boundary blurs.  In 
other words, how do firms govern collaboration where owning a production unit is not a strategic option? 
7 See Helper, Susan, John Paul MacDuffie, and Charles Sabel, “Pragmatic Collaborations: Advancing 
Knowledge while Controlling Opportunism,” 9 Industrial and Corporate Change 443 (2000). 
8 Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy, economists at Harvard Business School, MIT, and Univ. of Southern 
California respectively, have looked at the control rights used in strategic alliances between biotechnology 
firms.  Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin Murphy, “Strategic Alliances: Bridges between ‘Islands 
of Conscious Power,” unpublished manuscript—MIT working paper (2004) available at 
http://web.mit.edu/rgibbons/www/Strategic%20Alliances.pdf; Baker, George, Robert Gibbons, and Kevin 
Murphy, “Contracting for Control,” unpublished manuscript presented at The Law and Economics of 
Contracts Conference, Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia Law School, April 7-8 (2006), 
available at http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/law_economics/Confrences#96639 (scroll down 
until you find the “Gibbons” paper).  However, this research, discussed more fully below, has assumed that 
the relationships are governed through incentives—i.e. it has pursued a research question one step beyond 
the more fundamental question investigated here. 
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collaborators.  In such cases, the dominant mode of contract interpretation—the UCC’s 
contextualist approach—proves ill-suited to resolving conflicts that arise under pragmatic 
governance.  It is also unlikely, moreover, that any of current alternatives to 
contextualism—the default rules project or neoformalism—would appropriately support 
innovative collaboration.  A new theory of contract enforcement is necessary.  The 
foundation for this new theory, outlined below, is found in the problem-solving judicial 
intervention elaborated below.   
From a disciplinary perspective the article’s ambition is thus two-fold.  First, by 
providing empirical support for theories of pragmatic governance, it exposes limits in the 
traditional understanding of how modern production is governed.   From this perspective 
the article has broad ramifications for current debates on how to fine-tune and/or temper a 
global economy of breathtaking complexity.  Second, in analyzing how disputes between 
collaborators are adjudicated, the article suggests that current debates in contract law 
between contextualists and neo-formalists overlook an important, innovative institution 
of co-ordination that systematically blurs the distinction between the standard ones.  
Thus, in theorizing the private bar’s obvious—if unarticulated—creativity in ordering 
commercial cooperation, this article has immediate and practical ramifications for how 
judges and arbitrators adjudicate modern contract disputes.     
Though the developments discussed here plainly have important implications for 
corporate law, intellectual property, antitrust,9 and other aspects of contract theory 
beyond the theories of contract interpretation under discussion, all these are deferred to 
future work. 
                                                 
9 For the first discussion of innovative collaboration’s implications for antitrust law see Svetiev, Yane, 
“Antitrust Governance,” ExpressO Preprint Series, paper 1224 (2006). 
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The paper is organized along the four conceptual categories Ian Macneil has 
identified as necessary for any valid contract theory to address.10  Part II discusses firms’ 
transactional behavior—i.e. the actual strategies behind firms’ cooperation in the current 
market.  Part III details the various theories available to explain this behavior and argues 
that a particular theory—pragmatic governance—is the most accurate.  Part IV describes 
how the contracts observed in Part II are enforced and illustrates how the present system 
of contract enforcement is not appropriate for the new type of contracting.  Thus, Parts II 
through IV lay out this paper’s positive claim.  Finally, Part V, after surveying the 
alternative arguments, provides the paper’s normative claim: an eclectic institution 
comprising formalist and problem-solving elements is best suited to enforce these new 
contracts.    
 
II. Current Behavior: De-integration, Innovation, and Collaboration 
A. Three Hallmarks of the New Economy 
The “new economy” has passed in the last decade from over-hyped miracle to 
vulnerable but persisting and widely acknowledged reality.  Here “new economy” refers 
to a production system, found in both “new” and “old” industries alike,11  defined by 
three complementary features: first, the de-integration of the vertically-integrated firm; 
second, the increasing prevalence of product innovation as the criterion upon which 
companies compete; and third, the use of collaborative arrangements as both a 
                                                 
10 Macneil, Ian, “Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries,” 95 Nw. U.L. Rev 877, 877 (2000) 
(contract theory ought to “mak[e] careful distinctions between (1) descriptions of contract behavior and 
norms, (2) theories concerning such behavior, (3) descriptions of the law governing such behavior, and (4) 
prescriptions about the law that should govern.”) 
11 Thus, Josh Whitford refers to the “new old economy”—e.g. manufacturing industries where traditional 
processes are giving way to new modes of production.  Whitford, Josh, THE NEW OLD ECONOMY: 
NETWORKS, INSTITUTIONS, AND THE ORGANIZATIONAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURING 
2 (2005). 
 6
replacement for vertical integration and a means for accelerating innovation processes.  
Globalization, another hallmark of the new economy, underlies all three in that increased 
exposure to foreign markets pushes firms to embrace the three complementary strategies.   
Over the first three quarters of the 20th century, firms vertically integrated 
production—i.e. design, manufacture, and marketing processes were all found under the 
same roof.12  Beginning around the late 1970s, however, firms began de-integrating: 
shedding processes not located within the firms’ core competencies. 13  Resulting from 
de-integration are not only leaner but also interconnected firms.14  This network structure 
arises as manufacturers simultaneously give more business to fewer suppliers and 
encourage those suppliers to build relationships with end-users and other suppliers.15 
                                                 
12 Chandler, supra note 1, at 285-6 (“The modern industrial enterprise—the archetype of today’s giant 
corporation—resulted from the integration of the processes of mass production with those of mass 
distribution within a single business firm…. By 1917 the integrated industrial enterprise had become the 
most powerful institution in American business and, indeed, in the entire American economy.”); see also 
Zingales, Luigi, “In Search of Foundations” J. of Finance, 2000, v55(4,Aug), 1623,1626. 
13 Feenstra, Robert C., “Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy,” 12 
J. of Econ. Perspectives 31, 31 (1998) (“The rising integration of world markets has brought with it a 
disintegration of the production process, in which manufacturing or services activities done abroad are 
combined with those performed at home. Companies are now finding it profitable to outsource increasing 
amounts of the production process, a process which can happen either domestically or abroad. This 
represents a breakdown in the vertically-integrated mode of production—the so-called ‘‘Fordist’’ 
production, exemplified by the automobile industry—on which American manufacturing was built.”). See 
also Whitford, supra note __, at 17 (describing the shift of “once-vertically-integrated manufacturers” from 
using capacity to specialized subcontracting)(original italics).   
14 Zingales, Luigi, supra note __, at 1626. (“Large conglomerates have been broken up, and their units have 
been spun off as stand-alone companies. Vertically integrated manufacturers have relinquished direct 
control of their suppliers and moved towards looser forms of collaboration.”).  Florida describes the 
interconnection in Midwestern manufacturing as follows: “Indeed, larger manufacturing establishments 
typically act as hubs in broader production networks.  In doing so, they function to accelerate the diffusion 
of new forms of production organization through their supplier networks.  Close, interactive, and co-
dependent relationships between these hubs and their suppliers play an important role in the transfer and 
diffusion of new manufacturing technologies and organizational practices.”  Florida, Richard [networks in 
Midwest] at 327 (original italics). 
15 Whitford, supra note __,  at 17 (“OEMs give more business to fewer suppliers, and forge closer 
relationships with a core strategic group that they hope to align with their own goals.  Importantly, these 
key suppliers are not envisioned as mere satellites orbiting a dominant but benevolent patron, dependent 
and beholden.  Rather, in a practice somewhat in tension with the desire to extract priority treatment when 
needed, OEMs push many of their suppliers to be more independent and to work closely with other 
customers and end-use industries.”). 
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The networks between firms that arise are crucial to innovation: in order to 
compete in the “high-speed learning race” characteristic of the new economy,16 
firms must “build and maintain an increasing number of ‘knowledge nodes’ with 
lead users, universities, technical-service institutes, [and] user communities.”17  
Within these networks, firms engage in disciplined experimentation to realize 
innovative product development.18  Thus, collaborative networks arise not only 
out of intentions to cost-save (the much-heralded impetus behind outsourcing) but 
also because “[b]y divesting non-core functions, lead firms can more quickly reap 
value from innovations while spreading risk in volatile markets.”19 
       
B. Case Study: Apple Computer and SCI Systems20 
Following its largest quarterly loss in company history, Apple announced, in 
1996, that it was selling its primary manufacturing facility in Fountain, CO.  What made 
this sale different from a typical attempt to generate cash flow through the sale of assets 
was that the plant was being sold to SCI Systems, an electronics contract manufacturing 
firm.  The move puzzled those following the industry since the consensus at the time was 
that Apple struggled not from lack of demand but rather from an inability to meet 
demand.21  In such a situation, one would expect Apple to invest in improving its 
                                                 
16 Whitford, supra note __, at 18 (citing DiMaggio The Twenty-First Century Firm 2001 at 222). 
17 Foss, supra note __,  
18 See e.g. Eisenhardt, Kathleen M.  and Behnam N. Tabrizi, “Accelerating Adaptive Processes: Product 
Innovation in the Global Computer Industry,” 40 Administrative Science Quarterly 84 (1995). 
19 Sturgeon, Timothy, “Modular Production Networks: A New American Model of Industrial 
Organization,” 11 Industrial and Corporate Change 451, 452 (2002). 
20 The information for this case study is taken from an article by Timothy Sturgeon on the network 
properties of modern production.  Id. at 456-8. 
21 Sturgeon explains Apple’s problem as follows: 
“Apple’s gambit to protect its market share against those companies offering PCs based on 
Microsoft’s Windows operating system and Intel’s x86 microprocessor architecture (known in the 
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manufacturing capability, not to sell it off.  The sale of the Fountain plant can be 
understood, however, as a paradigmatic example of strategic de-integration and 
collaboration. 
The key fact of the deal was that the Fountain plant would still manufacture Apple 
computers.  Rather than losing the manufacturing capacity entirely, Apple secured a three 
year deal with SCI for the production of Apple systems.  In other words, Apple was 
outsourcing manufacturing.  SCI could, of course, use the facilities to produce systems 
for Apple’s competitors.  This, however, was a small price to pay for what Apple gained 
from the deal: first, a reduction in manufacturing overhead and inventory-carrying costs; 
and, second, the benefit of access to SCI’s economies of scale.  Furthermore, Apple 
benefited also from the incremental innovation process included in the deal.22  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, 
[t]he sale provided Apple with the ability to alter the volume of its 
production upward or downward at very short notice without installing or 
idling any of its own plant or equipment.  Of particular interest to Apple’s 
management was the improved ‘upside flexibility’—the ability to quickly 
ramp production volumes upward to meet unexpected surges in demand—
that the deal with SCI provided.23 
 
SCI’s responsiveness was made possible through close inter-firm collaboration.  As we 
will see in Part III below, when the Apple-SCI contract is examined in detail, the parties 
                                                                                                                                                 
industry as ‘WINTEL’) by offering cheaper, lower-performance machines backfired when 
customers flocked to Apple’s higher-performance products instead.  Apple’s manufacturing 
operation were not nimble enough to make up for this poor forecasting by quickly increasing 
production of higher-end machines.  The PC industry as a whole had grown 25% during 1995 and 
many key components, particularly memory chips, were in short supply.  Order for high-end 
machines went unfilled and low-end machines began piling up as unsold inventory.  The result 
was that Apple lost its already tenuous hold on some of its customers, who, unable to buy Apple 
machines with the capability of utilizing the industry’s new ‘killer application,’ the World Wide 
Web, migrated to readily available, powerful and relatively inexpensive WINTEL machines.  By 
April 1996, Apple’s share of the worldwide PC market had fallen to an all-time low of 5.8%, 
down from 7.7% from the first quarter of 1995.”   
Id. at 457, fn5. 
22 See the analysis of the Apple-SCI contract in Part III below. 
23 Id. at 458. 
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agreed to co-produce Apple’s computer equipment using a JIT format.  Thus, the Apple-
SCI deal illustrates all three pillars of the new economy: Apple de-integrated by 
outsourcing production to SCI, an innovation process was part of the strategy, and the 
firms intertwined themselves in a close collaboration.   
 
III. Theorizing transactional behavior 
This section proceeds as follows: first, incomplete contracting theory’s attempt to 
explain the behavior just described is presented.  We will see that the explanation is 
insufficient, primarily because it fails to grapple with what this paper terms “endogenous 
uncertainty:” the situation where innovators, whose joint-strivings towards novelty 
decontextualize their decision-making to the point that relevant heuristics for risk 
calculation are unavailable, are uncertain as to how to define their own self-interest.  In 
the second part we will see that the theory of “pragmatic coordination mechanisms” 
developed by Sabel and colleagues provides a better explanation for how innovative 
collaborations are governed and, furthermore, that it is corroborated by qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of current contractual coordination mechanisms. 
 
A. Theory 
The Apple-SCI collaboration seems to invite hold-ups.  Hold-up problems arise 
wherever firms make investments that have little or no value outside of the relation to 
which they are initially dedicated. When investments are highly relationship-specific the 
less vulnerability party can always threaten to withhold its contribution unless the terms 
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of exchange are changed in its favor.24  Vertical integration is traditionally viewed as the 
common mechanism for overcoming hold-ups: i.e. where relationship-specific 
investments stymie parties’ efforts to collaborate, one of the parties will acquire the other 
(assuming the collaboration is that worthwhile), thus governing the relationship through 
ownership rather than contract.25  As Part II illustrates, however, contemporary firms 
have been substituting property rights governance with contract mechanisms.  This is 
puzzling because information asymmetries, transaction costs, and uncertainty26 preclude 
parties from being able to draft all of the terms necessary to preclude all forms of 
potential opportunism.  In other words, contracts are incomplete.  But if contracts are 
incomplete, what is doing the work?   
1. Governance Through Incentives 
                                                 
24 The logic of the hold-up problem is that where a firm, such as SCI, has invested in assets highly specific 
to the relationship, the opportunity arises for the other party to leverage this investment into concessions: 
due to the high-specificity of the investment, the second-best use of the invested assets is significantly 
lower than the first-best; thus, the firm will concede more of the bargain’s benefit to the party threatening to 
abandon the relationship.  If parties are aware of this possibility before the bargain is struck, then they will 
be reluctant to bargain at all.  A “hold-up” occurs. See Williamson, Oliver, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985). 
25 See Klein, Benjamin, R. Crawford, and A.A. Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process,” 21 J. of Law and Economics, 297 (1978); see also Klein,  Benjamin, 
“Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body–General Motors Relationship 
Revisited,” in O. Williamson and S. Winter, eds., The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution and 
Development, 213 (1991); Klein, Benjamin, “Hold-up Problem,” in P.K. Newman, ed., The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics and Law, 241–244 (1998); Klein, Benjamin, “Fisher-General Motors and the 
Nature of the Firm,” 43 Journal of Law and Economics 105 (2000).  The factual interpretation upon which 
this theory of vertical integration is based has been roundly criticized of late.  See Coase, Ronald “The 
Acquisition of Fisher Body by General Motors,” 43 Journal of Law and Economics 15 (2000);  Freeland, 
R. “Creating Holdup Through Vertical Integration: Fisher Body Revisited,” 43 Journal of Law and 
Economics 33 (2000); Casadesus-Masanell, R. and D. Spulber, “The Fable of Fisher Body,” 43 Journal of 
Law and Economics 67 (2000); Helper et al., supra note __.  By theorizing an alternative method for 
preventing hold-ups, this paper can be considered another argument against Klein’s explanation for vertical 
integration.  See generally Coase, Ronald, “The Conduct of Economics: The Example of Fisher Body and 
General Motors,” 15 J. of Economics and Management Strategy 255 (2006). 
26“First, in a complex and highly unpredictable world, it is hard for people to think very far ahead and to 
plan for all the various contingencies that may arise.  Second, even if individual plans can be made, it is 
hard for the contracting parties to negotiate about these plans…. Third, even if the parties can plan and 
negotiate about the future, it may be very difficult for them to write their plans down in such a way that, in 
the event of a dispute and outside authority—a court, say—can figure out what these plans mean and 
enforce them.” Hart, Oliver, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE 23 (1995)(original italics). 
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Incomplete Contracting Theory: The Grossman-Hart-Moore (GHM) Approach 
and Control Rights.   
Microeconomics suggests how incomplete contracts govern uncertain 
collaborations.27  First, parties set rules for performance under foreseeable contingencies.  
Ex ante rule setting allocates risks between parties according to their expected utilities, 
risk-sensitivities, and respective bargaining powers.  Second, because some decisions are 
non-contractible ex ante because certain contingencies are unforeseeable, parties to all 
but spot transactions renegotiate terms ex post.28  Such renegotiation places great 
strategic importance upon contractually determining the ex post control over key issues in 
the ext ante stage, since allocation of this control determines each party’s later bargaining 
leverage.29  Hart differentiates between contractually specified control (“specific rights”) 
and the unspecified control that the contracting parties retain to themselves (“residual 
rights”).  30  The latter, characteristic of property rights, are “generic rights to make 
production decisions in circumstances not spelled out in the contract.”31  Since parties are 
not relying on ownership (property rights) for governance—using contract mechanisms 
                                                 
27 It is important to note, before beginning, that they typically have a slightly different focus than ours here: 
rather than looking at how the relationships are governed, economists have been asking how or when they 
will be efficiently governed.  See e.g. Gulati, Ranjay, “Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of 
Repeated Ties for Contractual Choice in Alliances,” 38 Academy of Management J. 85, 87 (1995) 
(“Transaction cost economics is not only concerned with the emergence of organizations per se to manage 
transaction costs, but also with how the choice of organizational form may vary according to the specific 
types of exchange activities encompassed.  Thus, a second-order question examined is, how can existing 
exchange relations be structured to economize on transaction costs?”).  Thus, the governance mechanism—
incentives—is assumed in their models.  This paper, on the other hand, takes a step further back in the 
causal chain, focusing instead upon first principles. 
28 See, e.g., Baird, Douglas, “Self-interest and Cooperation in Long-term Contracts” 19 J. of Legal Studies 
583, 586 (“renegotiations [are used] to realign the obligations of the parties when conditions change 
unexpectedly”).   
29 Hart, supra note __, at 3 (“the ex post allocation of power (or control) matters.  Here power refers 
roughly to the position of each party if the other party does not perform (e.g. if the other party behaves 
opportunitistically.”).     
30 See Id. at 5-6. 
31 Foss, supra note __, at 28. 
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instead—our attention turns to specific rights.  Specific control rights rein in the 
possibility of uncertainty-caused opportunism by defining each party’s rights as to who 
gets to make particular decisions in certain domains, regardless of contingencies.  This 
defines not only decision-making but also contract renegotiation.  I.e. the party with the 
control right in a particular area will have the upper hand if its collaborator wants to 
renegotiate in that domain later.32  Establishing the power balances for later 
renegotiations determines the incentives that then constrain parties’ behavior.33  Thus, 
parties govern their collaborations by bargaining over control rights and renegotiating 
when contractual gaps emerge. 
 There are three problems with this explanation.  First, it is not entirely clear why 
parties would contract at all where control rights are the sole form of governance.  If ex 
post renegotiation is inevitable, then why should parties bother to negotiate ex ante?—not 
only is writing the contract costly, but explicitly allocating risks often makes adjusting 
those risks later more difficult.34  As change becomes more frequent and substantial—as 
is likely when partners are innovating—the control rights mechanism becomes more 
implausible: the renegotiations will have to occur more often, the adjustments more 
dramatic.  Furthermore, there is a perverse incentive at work here: the more hazardous 
issues are those most likely to be renegotiated.  Thus, parties have an incentive to 
postpone contracting on these points at the ex ante stage.  This is not to say that it would 
never make sense to contract ex ante.  Rather, the critique here is that there are 
                                                 
32Baker et al, supra note __, [2006] at 8. 
33 Id.  
34 Baird at 592 (“the assertion that parties leave gaps rests on the premise that it is easier to renegotiate 
around silence than around a clearly allocated risk.”); see also Kimball, George, “Governance and Dispute 
Resolution: Making it Work—the Heavy Lifting,” in OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2005, Delaney and 
Tanenbaum, eds. 490 (2005). (practitioner describing renegotiation as “difficult because the parties already 
know one another well, the honeymoon is over, and each has some disproportionate importance in the 
minds of participants.  Often little has been forgiven or forgotten.”)(original italics). 
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reasonably imaginable scenarios where the governance mechanism will discourage 
parties from bargaining where collaboration would otherwise be efficient.  The second 
problem, with an outcome similar to the first, is practical: the rapidly changing 
environment part and parcel to an economy driven by high technology makes frequent 
formal renegotiation prohibitively costly.  Parties would have to constantly renegotiate as 
new contingencies arose.  Another way of saying this is that the division between ex ante 
and ex post negotiation begins to blur as the rate of change increases and that, as the ex 
ante/ex post division blurs, so does the plausibility of the mechanism.  And third, 
governance through control rights assumes you know ex ante what you want to control—
in situations where this assumption is false, control rights are at best blunt instruments.   
 Indeed, recent empirical work suggests that the GHM control rights model of 
incomplete contracting, described above, does not explain the governance of inter-firm 
collaboration.  In their 2006 paper, Baker et al. compared the results of three studies with 
the predictions of the GHM governance model.  All three showed the allocation of rights 
over ex post decisions to have minimal or no impact on ex ante choices.35   
The Relational Contracting Explanation 
Having called the standard approach into question, Baker et al. put forward their 
own explanation: control rights could govern collaborations, not implicitly as the GHM 
model argued, but explicitly through ex ante allocation of rights to make particular ex 
post decisions.36  I.e. parties would adapt as uncertainty resolved, per Simon’s original 
                                                 
35 Baker et al., supra note __, [2006] at 11-14. 
36 Id. at 2 (“[T]he role of decision rights in the property-rights model is indirect: decision rights are akin to 
bargaining chips that determine the parties’ incentives to invest in their transaction; if the parties’ 
investments were determined by other forces, then who holds which decision rights would be irrelevant. 
In this paper, we develop and analyze a theoretical framework in which decision rights matter directly: 
control matters because it will be used, not just because it acts as a bargaining chip.”). 
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formulation, by assigning the control over a particular realm of adaptation decisions to 
one of the parties.37  Although this mode of governance could not govern spot 
transactions between collaborators efficiently, Baker et al. claim that it can govern 
relational contracting situations.   
Relational theories of contract stress the role informal incentives have in 
relationship governance.  Parties may be constrained not to act opportunistically in a 
situation where there is a gap in the contract (where there is no formal rule addressing the 
contingency) due to an informal social rule.  This is possible as the personal ties that 
develop over an extended relationship “exert pressure for conformity to expectations.”38  
There are two mutually-reinforcing considerations exerting pressure here: first, failing to 
conform to unwritten social norms results in damage to one’s reputation in the 
marketplace—reputational damage is important to actors intending to be repeat players;39 
and second, properly conforming to these social norms builds trust between parties40—an 
incentive to conform because “[t]rust counteracts fear of opportunistic behavior and as a 
result, is likely to limit the transaction costs associated with an exchange.”41  Thus, the 
key premise to relational contracting is time: long-term interaction is necessary for 
informal norms to substitute for formal rules.  Without long-term interactions, firms are 
concerned about neither their reputation in the marketplace nor the benefits of building 
trust with their collaborators.   
                                                 
37 Id.; see Simon, Herbert, “A Formal Theory of the Employment Relationship,” 19 Econometrica 293 
(1951). 
38 Macaulay, Stewart, “Non-Contractual Relations and Business: A Preliminary Study,” 28 American 
Sociological Rev. 55, 63 (1963). 
39 Gulati, supra note __, at 93 (“reputational considerations… play an important role in each firm’s 
potential for future alliances.”). 
40 “At the organizational level, observers point to numerous examples of ‘preferential, stable, obligated, 
bilateral trading relationships’ to illustrate that firms develop close bonds with other firms through 
recurrent interactions.” Gulati at 92, citing Sabel 1991. 
41 Gulati, supra note __, at 93. 
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 Building off of Klein’s claim that control rights create a “self-enforcement range” 
where reputational considerations govern,42 Baker et al. argue that decision rights can 
efficiently govern inter-firm collaborations where those collaborations are repeated 
games.  In repeated game situations, a party can choose a decision, despite immediate 
loss, that produces a higher social surplus than what is available in a spot transaction 
because of the likelihood that the other party will return the favor in the future.  Whether 
or not a party actually does so depends upon whether the payoff from the optimal 
relational decisions is greater than the party’s temptation to renege.  The authors formally 
model the temptation to renege as 
 Ri(s)≡πii(d*i(s),s)- πi(dRC(s),s)43 
and claim that the optional relational decision (dRC) can be implemented if and only if  
 Ri≡MAXRi(s)≤1/r(V(dRC)(.))-VSP) 
—i.e. if and only if, first, the party’s relational payoff exceeds the spot market payoff 
and, second, the resulting difference is greater than or equal to that party’s maximum 
reneging temptation.44  This then leads to their governance prescription: by assigning the 
                                                 
42 Klein, Benjamin, “Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships,” 34 
Economic Inquiry 444, 444 (1996) (“[A]lthough… many business relationships are enforced, transactors 
are not indifferent regarding the contract terms they choose to govern their self-reinforcing relationships…. 
[T]he fundamental economic motivation for the use of self-enforceable contract terms is to supplement 
self-enforcement.  Court-enforced explicit contract terms are a necessary evil that is used by transactors 
solely because the transactors possess limited reputational capital…. It makes no sense to analyze the 
malincentive effects of contract terms in isolation from self-enforcement…. Incomplete contract terms 
cannot be understood without recognizing that their role is to control [the reneging temptation] so that it 
remains below [the surplus created by the relationship].”). 
43 Where Ri is the temptation to renege, s is a given state of the world, πi(d*i(s),s) is the party’s payoff from 
reneging, and πi(dRC(s),s) is the party’s payoff from implementing the relational decision.  Baker et al. 
[2006], supra note __, at 16. 
44 Where Ri is, again, the reneging temptation, MAXRi(s) is the maximum temptation during a given state of 
the world, r is interest rate per period during the time of the repeated game, V(dRC)(.) is the optimal payoff 
from the relationally implemented decision rule, and VSP is the optimal payoff from a spot transaction.  Id. 
at 17. 
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right to make a particular decision to the party with the lowest incentive to renege, formal 
contracts can complement the informal reputational constraints at work.45     
 This model’s assumptions are vulnerable in two respects.  First, Baker et al.’s 
inability to explain how one-off transactions can be efficiently governed is fatal because 
few collaborations exhibit relational contracting characteristics.  It is doubtful that parties 
have enough time and exposure (i.e. game iterations) in innovative collaborations to forge 
relational governance mechanisms.  This is for two reasons: first, modern firms often 
require an intimate level of collaboration immediately.  Parties who have never 
collaborated before agree to exchange personnel, openly share proprietary information, 
rely upon JIT supplying, etc.  At these opening stages, relational ties are weak.46  Second, 
because firms collaborate for relatively short periods of time (3-5 years), there is also a 
significant amount of relational turnover.47  In other words, firms are constantly starting 
anew; games do not repeat.  Indeed, in a previous paper, Baker et al. note that of the 
12,500 strategic alliance agreements between biotech companies they analyzed, 9462 
pairs of firms never consummated more than one deal and only 57 pairs did more than 
                                                 
45 Baker et al. [2006], supra note __, at 15-17, 19-20 (“a relational contract could achieve first-best 
adaptation, if either party agreed to do what the other party preferred in certain states.  The question now 
becomes to which party should the decision right be allocated in order to facilitate a self-enforcing 
relational contract? The relational contracts would differ depending on which party held the decision 
right….  In this example there is a clear answer to which relational contract yields lower maximum 
reneging temptation, and thus is more likely to be a self-enforcing equilibrium. If the decision right is 
allocated to the biotech firm, then it’s maximum reneging temptation occurs at state s+, where it would like 
to be involved in marketing and it would cost it ΝB(d1,s+) to acquiesce to not being involved. However, if 
the pharma company held the decision right, it would face a lower (in absolute value) maximum reneging 
temptation…. Since the absolute value of its maximum reneging temptation is less than ΝB(d1,s+), the 
relational contract that has the pharma company controlling the decision right is feasible for higher discount 
rates than a relational contract that has the biotech firm controlling the decision right.”). 
46 Beckman, Christine, Pamela Haunschild, and Damon Philips, “Friends or Strangers?  Firm-Specific 
Uncertainty, Market Uncertainty, and Network Partner Selection,” 15 Organization Science 259, 261 
(2004) (“New relationships, on average, are typically weaker… than existing relationships”). 
47 In their 2004 study, Baker et al. found the average duration for a collaboration to be 33 months.  Baker et 
al. [2004], supra note __, at 21.  Furthermore, a literature on “modularity” has emerged to explain how 
firms consistently transition between these relationships.  See e.g. Richard N. Langlois, “Modularity in 
Technology and Organization”, 49 Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 34 (2002);  
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five together.48  Relational contracting may be in the eye of the beholder; however, it 
seems just as reasonable to infer a dearth of reputational constraints from such statistics 
as the possibility of such.   
Some might retort that the parties can rely upon each other’s wider reputations 
within the market.  However, with the rapid introduction of new technologies opening 
entirely new markets and globalization destabilizing markets old and new alike, it is 
questionable whether reputational norms exist for large swaths of the economy.  It is 
noteworthy in this regard that the work on private ordering has focused solely upon 
insular, even peculiarly unique, industries: Southern cotton growers, ultra-orthodox 
Jewish diamond merchants, Maghribi traders, etc.49  Undoubtedly, reputation is a ready 
currency in the confines of Shasta County.50  Relational governance’s efficacy is more 
doubtful, however, in volatile global markets.51 
 Endogenous Uncertainty 
 There is a second critique of the Baker et al. approach—one which questions 
some of contemporary microeconomics’ core assumptions.  It is that governance by 
decision rights is extremely difficult both because parties are unable to anticipate their 
optimal payoffs and because parties cannot calculate their own reneging temptations.  I.e. 
in the terms of the Baker et al. model, dRC and Ri are not only unverifiable but also 
                                                 
48 Baker et al. [2004], supra note __, at 21 (reasoning that the possibility of a long-term relationship is the 
source of reputational constraint)(italics added). 
49 Respectively, Bernstein, Lisa, “Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation 
through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,” 99 Mich. L. Rev 1724 (2001); Barak, Richman, “Community 
Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York,” 31 Law & Social Inquiry 
383 (2006); Greif, Avner, “Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The 
Maghribi Traders’ Coalition,” 83 American Economic Rev. 525 (1993).  
50 Ellickson, Robert C., ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). 
51 Bernstein acknowledges this in a footnote: “Over the past ten years, however, technological 
advancements and other market changes have occurred that may, over the long run, undermine the ability 
of [cotton] industry institutions to promote cooperation.”  Bernstein, supra note __, n.233. 
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unobservable.  The nature of innovative collaboration is the cause of this profound 
uncertainty.  Without parties’ ability to calculate the optimal payoff or their own reneging 
temptations, the decision rights model of collaborative governance becomes highly 
problematic.   
Innovation is awash in uncertainty.52  This is a problem: uncertainty, the fount of 
opportunism, gives parties, ever guileful, opportunity to take advantage of another party’s 
ignorance.53  Incentive-based theories of governance claim, of course, to address this.  
Both formal contract terms and informal relational constraints are theorized as attempts to 
limit uncertainty.  Explicit terms limit uncertainty by committing parties to perform 
certain actions in the future, regardless of how events unfold.  These explicit 
commitments are made credible through external and legitimate adjudication.  Relational 
constraints work in the same way except informally: social norms commit parties to 
perform certain actions in the future.  In either respects, parties rely upon credible 
commitments to order relations in an uncertain world. 
 What incentive-based governance overlooks, however, is innovation’s 
decontextualizing effect on transactions.  When collaborators innovate, two things 
happen: first, the parties’ positions within their social networks become obscured.  It 
becomes more difficult to gauge parties’ behavior against other industry players when 
they are purposefully doing something different.  Furthermore, as noted above, 
innovation unsettles markets and, thus, firm networks—as communities disintegrate, so 
                                                 
52 Teece, supra note __, at 194 (““Innovation is a quest into the unknown. It involves searching and the 
probing and reprobing of technological as well as market opportunities. With hindsight, much effort is 
spent traveling down blind alleys. Serendipity and luck play an important role.”). 
53 Williamson, Oliver, “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,” 36 J. of Law and Economics 
453, 458 (1993) (“Opportunism is a self-interest-seeking assumption.  By contrast with simple self-interest 
seeking, according to which economic agents will continuously consult their own preferences but will 
candidly disclose all pertinent information on inquiry and will reliable discharge all covenants, 
opportunistic agents are given to self-interest seeking with guile.”). 
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do their norms, thus un-constraining firms.  In short, the relational decontextualization 
experienced with innovation undermines reputational constraints.   
 Second, innovation introduces a qualitatively different type of uncertainty into the 
collaboration by distancing the parties from traditional heuristics for anticipating market 
behavior.  Frank Knight described the method actors employ to make business decisions 
in the face of uncertainty as follows: 
There are two fundamentally different ways of arriving at the probability 
judgment [needed to make a decision].  The first method is by a priori 
calculation, and is applicable to and used in games of chance.  This is also 
the type of case usually assumed in logical and mathematical games of 
chance.  It must be strongly contrasted with the very different type of 
problem in which calculation is impossible and the result is reached by the 
empirical method of applying statistics to actual instances…. [T]he first, 
mathematical or a priori, type of probability is practically never met with 
in business, while the second is extremely common.54 
   
The difference in calculation Knight describes above provides the foundation for his 
classic differentiation between risk and uncertainty: risk being measurable, uncertainty 
being immeasurable.55  Knight pins our hopes of making a reliable estimation—i.e. 
transforming an uncertainty into a risk—on our chances of “securing the same degree of 
homogeneity in the instances classed together.”56  In other words, we can make more 
reliable estimations, and thus approach probabilistic calculation, where we can find larger 
sample sizes of similar occurrences.  Where there is “no valid basis of any kind for 
classifying instances,” however, one can only rely upon guesswork.57  Innovation is one 
such instance, since the creative process, by definition, introduces heterogeneity into a 
                                                 
54 Knight, Frank, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 214-5 (1921). 
55 Id. at 229 (“The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the 
former the distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori 
or from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty this is not true, the reason being in 
general that it is impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree 
unique.”). 
56 Id. at 216. 
57 Id. at 225. 
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class of heretofore similar experiences.  Engaging in this creative process with another 
party only further impedes probability calculation by introducing information 
asymmetries.  In other words, by decontextualizing decision-making, innovation makes 
calculating dRC extremely difficult.  Prediction only becomes possible as actors stop 
innovating and routinize their transactions; however, this undermines the collaboration’s 
very purpose. 
Standard economic theory tries to get around the problem of uncertainty by 
reinterpreting situations of uncertainty as situations of risk.58   Even theories of 
information asymmetry and bounded rationality—ostensibly theories that address 
uncertainty—presume actor rationality.59  One might argue that this approach can apply 
here because a basis for classifying instances will emerge as a party gains more and more 
collaborative experience.  I.e. Party A can fashion a heuristic with which to judge a new 
collaboration with Party B by comparing its former collaborations with Parties X, Y, and 
Z.  As Party A generalizes the collaboration process, probabilistic calculation becomes 
possible.  If this argument is accurate, then economic theory’s approach, to transform 
uncertainty into risk, might be valid.   
Such a processual heuristic is unlikely to provide guidance, however, due to the 
dual nature of uncertainty under collaborative innovation.  For an actor engaged in 
collaborative innovation, future events of two types are uncertain.60  As mentioned above, 
                                                 
58 Beckert, Jens, “What is Sociological about Economic Sociology? Uncertainty and the Embeddedness of 
Economic Action,” 25 Theory and Society 803, 813 (1996)(“[to preserve] the rational-actor model… 
situations of uncertainty are reinterpreted as situations of risk—in the sense of Knight’s distinction—in that 
the individual has information on which to base probability calculations.”).   
59 Id. At 804-5; see e.g. Williamson, Oliver, “Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization,” 36 J. of 
Law and Economics 453 (1993). 
60 A faint echo of this argument—that uncertainty is both exogenous and endogenous to the economic 
actor—can perhaps be found in Koopmann’s conception of uncertainty.  Koopmans, Tjalling, THREE 
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it is difficult, arguably impossible, for an actor to predict her collaborator’s future 
innovation decisions with any certainty.  I.e. events exogenous to the actor are uncertain.  
There is however, another type of uncertainty which economic theory has entirely 
overlooked: that endogenous to the actor.  As the innovators jointly abandon convention, 
they enter a fundamental state of uncertainty in reference to their own respective future 
interests.61  Innovation causes such endogenous uncertainty, even assuming that variables 
exogenous to the partnership are static, by removing the innovators from the existing 
institutional framework—the routines, conventional wisdom, and common heuristics—
they formerly used to construct their incentives.  In other words, a party to an innovative 
collaboration finds it difficult to say with any certainty what course of action it should 
take because, without pre-determined self interest, they cannot judge the possible 
outcomes resulting from a decision option.  The following excerpt from a manager’s trial 
testimony, given in a commercial dispute between two collaborating firms, describes 
endogenous uncertainty in practical terms: 
                                                                                                                                                 
ESSAYS IN THE STATE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 163 (1957) (“Primary uncertainty arises from random acts of 
nature and unpredictable changes in concurrent preferences.”) (italics added). 
61 For a discussion of the indeterminacy of “our forward looking interest in the unexperienced and the 
unpredictable” see Stuart, Henry Waldgrave, “The Phases of the Economic Interest” in CREATIVE 
INTELLIGENCE: ESSAYS IN THE PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE 282, 299 (1917)(arguing that our “constructive or 
progressive or creative interest”—determined through “constructive comparison,” which is a “transitive or 
inductive operation whereby the agent… embark[s] upon a new interest… [with a motive that] is neither 
more nor less than a supposition, on the agent’s part, that there may be forthcoming for him in the given 
case in hand just such an ‘epigenetic’ development of new significance and value as we have found actual 
history to disclose as a normal result of economic innovation”—is a better explanation of self-interest than 
“’dormant’ or implicit desire.”).  This idea of endogenous uncertainty also resembles what has been called 
“firm-specific uncertainty”—i.e. “uncertainty that is unique and often internal to the firm.”  Beckman et al., 
supra note __, at 260.  Beckman et al.’s conception seems to differ, however, from the endogenous 
uncertainty idea here in that they argue that firm-specific uncertainty can be resolved through recourse to 
new partners with unique information that can effectively address the firm’s outstanding internal problems.  
Id at 261 (“Thus, firms are likely to seek out such ties when experiencing uncertainty because this unique, 
novel information may be useful in addressing issues that the firm has been unable to address effectively 
with their existing sources of information.”).  The argument here is that such partnering also introduces 
additional uncertainty in turn or, in other words, that a significant portion of internal uncertainty arises from 
sources other than information asymmetries.   
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[P]art of the initial work that's done is to actually define and establish what 
it is you're going to do and what the parameters are, which you really don't 
know until you start to do some of the initial work.62 
 
In such a situation, where innovators find it problematic to compare possible outcomes, 
calculating their respective incentives to renege is rather inconceivable.63  Gauging Ri 
itself is guesswork.  If collaborators cannot anticipate their own incentives to renege with 
any accuracy, then it is hard to understand how the relational governance theorized by 
Baker et al. would ever materialize in a robust form: only the most risk-insensitive parties 
would consider such vaguely conceived ventures. 
◊ 
It is controversial to argue that interests are constructed, as opposed to taking 
them as given.64  This paper has found constructivist arguments persuasive only because 
the standard economic theory has become so attenuated.  Furthermore, perhaps 
constructed self-interest is not as radical as we think.  While the market often indicates 
that there may be an opportunity to solve a particular problem, it rarely dictates what 
form the solution should take or what steps are necessary to create that solution.  One 
need not believe that demand is manufactured65 to accept that exchange, often poorly 
communicated,66 is supple.  There is a realm of give-and-take at the intersection of the 
                                                 
62 Technology Solutions v. Northrop Grumman, 356 Ill.App.3d 380,436 (Ill. App. 1st Dist, 2d Div. 2005) 
(contract dispute between collaborators involved in the design and production of the B-2 stealth bomber). 
63 This inability to calculate future probability is exemplified in the alliance agreement between Cisco and 
KPMG, where the two parties can identify only “potential future benefits” in the vaguest of terms.  Cisco & 
KPMG contract of 29 Dec 1999, §2.3 available at http://contracts.onecle.com/bearingpoint/ 
cisco.collab.1999.12.29.shtml 
64 For a discussion of the constructivist/rationalist debate, see Blyth, Mark, GREAT TRANSFORMATIONS: 
ECONOMIC IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002) (transcending the 
debate by marrying the two approaches through an ideational theory of institutional change).  Blyth’s 
explication of uncertainty directed this author’s early thinking on the subject. 
65 See Veblen, Thorsteinn, THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITUTIONS (1904). 
66 See Akerlof, George, “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 84 
Quarterly J. of Economics 488 (1970). 
 23
supply and demand curves.67  While this means that the supplier can influence, to some 
extent, customers’ demand, this vagueness, exacerbated where firms are trying to create 
new products/processes, also means that producers have less input upon which to 
construct their own interests.  Innovators have much to learn—not only about the market 
but also about themselves.  Therefore, they experiment.   
2. Pragmatic Governance 
 There is another mechanism, besides explicit decision rules and reputational 
constraints, at work in these collaborations.  Firms include pragmatic governance 
mechanisms within their contracts.  While this new governance mechanism can be seen 
as a complement to the conventional mechanisms already discussed, it also displaces 
them to some extent in a theoretical sense.  I.e. it allows parties a measure of control in 
situations where incentive-based governance is unresponsive. 
   Pragmatic coordination mechanisms 
 Pragmatic coordination mechanisms are the means by which firms jointly explore 
the design, production, and organizational ambiguities endemic to innovative economic 
activity.68  As firms jointly inquire into what to produce and how to produce it, they 
publicize to each other information as the collaboration unfolds—this whittles away at 
information asymmetries that might arise and render parties vulnerable to exchange.69  
I.e., in an environment of open information, collaborators are able to monitor one 
another’s current behavior.70  Transparency governs.  Maintained “visibility” between 
                                                 
67 Leff, Arthur, SWINDLING AND SELLING: THE STORY OF LEGAL AND ILLEGAL CON-GAMES (1976). 
68 Helper et al., supra note __, at 445. 
69 Id.   
70 Sabel has referred to this as “learning by monitoring.” Sabel, Charles, “A Real-Time Revolution in 
Routines” forthcoming in Organizational Studies. 
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parties allows them to adjust to change and to meet the potential of the collaboration.71  
Thus, these pragmatic mechanisms provide not only the superstructure for coordinating 
economic activity but also a governance mechanism with which to police potential 
defectors. 
 Helper et al. identify three integrated pragmatic mechanisms: benchmarking, 
simultaneous engineering, and error detection/correction institutions.72   
Benchmarking.  Benchmarking is the origin of the creative collaborative process: 
without explicit instructions on how to innovate a solution for a particular problem, firms 
find an idea of how to proceed by probing possibilities, either through prototypes or 
searches, and then building the results of this probing into flexible development plans.  
Benchmarking is a direct response to the fundamental uncertainty described above: 
because firms cannot clearly identify their interests at the start of the innovation process, 
they begin by referencing ideas from peers, customers, and past experience.73  It is an 
experimental, benign form of cribbing.    
Benchmarking involves two closely related processes: prototyping and searching.  
In benchmarking by prototype, firms purposefully depart from proven models, develop a 
range of potential products, and test these potentials, often with consumers.74  This 
iterative dialogue, between collaborating firms and between collaborators and possible 
customers, sets the course for production.  When firms benchmark through search, they 
                                                 
71 Glasspiegel, supra note ___, at 434. 
72 Helper et al., supra note __, at 445. 
73 For a discussion of how performance rules are set through recourse to experience outside the immediate 
collaborative relationship in an IT setting, see Halvey, John K. and Barbara Murphy Melby, Information 
Technology Outsourcing Transactions: Process, Strategies, and Contracts, 2d ed. 421-422 (2005). 
74 For an interesting example in a developing economy, see Alvares, Antonio Carlos Teixeira and Jose 
Carlose Barbieri, “Innovation in Mature Industries: The Case of Brasilata S.A. Metallic Packaging” 
manuscript available at http://in3.dem.ist.utl.pt/downloads/cur2000/papers/S32P05.PDF (describing how a 
“participatory engineering” process, where line workers, engineers, and management collaborated at the 
prototype stage to create the first major innovation in paint can lids in over 90 years). 
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look to industry experience for comparable approaches.75  This search process may be 
formal: for example, benchmarking firms can be hired in the IT industry to compare 
service metrics and pricing structures with industry averages.76  An informal variant 
exists: often, and especially at the very outset of the innovation process, benchmarking 
searches are conducted by mining team members’ relationships with their peers.   I.e. 
information on industry standards is communicated via publications, conferences, and 
informal networks.  Once the initial probing has produced results, the innovators then 
build the results into a general production outline.  Production is subdivided, or 
“chunked,” into its constituencies, and teams are assigned to work out designs, still using 
benchmarking techniques, for their respective subunits.77  
                                                 
75 Sabel, Charles and Jonathan Zeitlin, “Neither Modularity nor Relational: Inter-Firm Collaboration in the 
New Economy,” 5 Enterprise and Society 12-13 (2004)(“These methods establish a first idea of what to 
produce (and how) through benchmarking: an exacting survey of current products and processes, 
supplemented by assessments of what new and unproved techniques that might become available for use.”)  
Benchmarking can also include searching the partners’ past performance for insight.  For instance, 
Glasspiegel identifies four possible methods of benchmarking: one, comparing performance to current cost 
(this only works where in-house operations are being outsourced); two, comparing performance with other 
received bids (this only works in the initial stages of the collaboration); three, comparing performance to 
the market (classic benchmarking); and four, comparing performance to advisor’s experience (this is 
simply a version of classic benchmarking).  Glasspiegel, Harry, Pricing the Outsourcing Deal: Financial 
Drivers for Outsourcing Contracts, in Delaney, John F. and William A. Tanenbaum, eds., THE 
OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2005: PROTECTING CRITICAL BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 431 (2005).  The basic 
point remains nonetheless: the fashioning of rules takes place outside of the parties’ immediate 
deliberation. 
76 Collier, Sam, “PLI-The Outsourcing Revolution: Some Trends, Issues and Solutions,” in THE 
OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION: PROTECTING CRITICAL BUSINESS FUNCTIONS USING OUTSOURCING, ASP & 
WEB SERVICE AGREEMENTS, Delaney, John F. and William A. Tanenbaum eds., 681-2 
(2002)(“Benchmarking engages an independent firm to measure charges and performance against 
prevailing market standards”). 
77 Sabel, supra note __, [Theory of a Real-time Revolution] at 25 (“To benchmark the potential of 
developmental work the team may ask for engineering simulations of possible outcomes, ‘flash market’ a 
product embodying a potentially valuable feature, or otherwise try to test the actual reaction of buyers to 
some approximation of the design they are exploring.  Assessing the results of these probes, and again 
guided by reference to leading examples and comparison of possibilities, the team next provisionally 
subdivides or, to take a term from cognitive science, ‘chunks’ its general goals into subtasks—the design of 
an engine, or heating, ventilation and air conditioning system—and chooses a specialist team from inside or 
outside the parent company to realize the initial specifications.”)(internal citations omitted). 
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 As a method of “iterated goal setting,”78 benchmarking means that collaborators 
work in a system without clearly defined rules.  Furthermore, as it takes place at regular 
intervals, benchmarking disrupts established expectations.79  Fluid goals replace static 
rules.  Because the new goals are established outside of the immediate agreement but 
without further bargaining, these rules are open to change without the parties’ 
deliberation.80   
 Simultaneous Engineering.  “Simultaneous engineering” is a catch-all phrase for 
the immediate, side-by-side cooperation between collaborators.  Also called “concurrent” 
engineering, it takes place where “‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ steps proceed 
simultaneously, each taking account of the (changes in the) requirements of the other.”81  
Just-in-time production, which requires interpenetration between collaborators to achieve 
the quick adjustment capabilities necessary for minimal inventory,82 is a classic example 
of simultaneous engineering.   
The close proximity necessary for simultaneous engineering to work creates an 
environment of rich information sharing, a key ingredient for governing inter-firm 
relationships.83  For instance, as collaborating teams begin working on their assigned 
projects, they encourage their partner teams to alter designs and processes in order to 
realize greater efficiency.84  Just-in-time production also facilitates error detection and 
                                                 
78 Helper et al., supra note __, at 466. 
79 Id. 
80 For discussion of the practicalities of using benchmarking as an alternative to deliberation as a change 
mechanism see Delaney, John F. and Ruth Ann Keene, Outsourcing Transactions: Strategies for Success, in 
Outsourcing Revolution 2004 at 44-46 (2004). 
81 Sabel, supra note __, [Theory of a Real-Time Revolution] at 45.  
82Halvey and Melby, supra note ___, at 138-9. 
83 See, e.g., Glasspiegel, supra note ____, at 434 for the importance of “maintain[ing] visibility” in 
collaborative relationships.   
84 Sabel, supra note __,Theory of a Real-time Revolution at 26 (“[T]he initial overall goals are modified by 
the methods of simultaneous or concurrent engineering, e.g. the engine-design group may find a way to 
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correction (discussed below).85  The greater symmetry of information in these 
collaborations, though not perfect, allows the parties to better self-enforce their 
agreements.   
 Error Detection and Correction.  Error detection and correction is the process for 
changing rules, though we have seen both benchmarking and simultaneous engineering 
have a role in such also.86  As noted before, because of the new economy’s rapid pace of 
change, frequent rule adjustment is required.87  While explicit renegotiation of contract 
terms is an option here as in any other type of contract, pragmatic governance also allows 
for rules to change through their very implementation.  I.e. as collaborators continually 
detect and correct errors in design and production as they perform, they adjust the rules 
that they are to follow.88   
This process of changing rules through implementation is best exemplified by the 
“Five Why’s” of the Toyoda production process.89  When confronted with a malfunction 
in the production system, producers following Toyoda principles perform “root cause 
analysis” rather than simply focusing on the error’s immediately proximate cause.  This 
root cause analysis, in simplified form, consists of asking the following five questions: 
                                                                                                                                                 
better its target specifications or to cut its manufacturing costs if it can persuade other component groups 
that design characteristics should be modified accordingly.”). 
85 Id. at 26 (“In just-in-time production, parts are supplied to each work station only as needed: ideally, one 
at a time. Hence disruptions are immediately visible.  A breakdown at one station halts production by 
stopping the flow of parts to downstream operations.”). 
86 The differentiation between these three categories is somewhat strained or, to wit, stylized. For example, 
parties can use error detection and correction techniques in the benchmarking process: e.g. one 
collaboration “reverse engineered the cost structure to identify inefficiencies in the existing operation and 
billing structure as a tool to lower costs during negotiation.”  Nathanson Rick, “Transformational 
Outsourcing” in OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2005 385 (2005).   
87 See also Ray, Ellen G., Scope of Services and Service Levels in Outsourcing Revolution 2004 539 
(2004)(“The definitive agreement must include a process for proactively addressing changes to [rules].”). 
88 For example, IT service levels are changed not only through “mutual agreement” but also through 
“automatic changes… based on continuous improvement.”  Id. at 552. 
89 For background on the Toyoda production process, see Ward, Allen, Jeffrey K. Liker, John J. Cristiano, 
Durward K. Sobek II, “The Second Toyota Paradox: How Delaying Decisions Can Make Better Cars 
Faster,” 36 Sloan Management Review 43 (1995). 
 28
Q: Why is machine A broken? 
A: No preventive maintenance was performed. 
 
Q: Why was the maintenance crew derelict?  
A: It is always repairing machine B.   
 
Q: Why is machine B always broken?    
A: The part it machines always jams.  
 
Q: Why does the jam recur?     
A: The part warps from heat stress.  
 
Q: Why does the part overheat? 
A: A design flaw.90  
 
As the firm corrects the error identified using the Five Why’s method, it alters corollary 
rules of performance without renegotiation—e.g. the firm in the example above redesigns 
not only the production process (by reallocating maintenance personnel) but also the 
product itself (by correcting the overheating problem).  Thus, rules are fluid both because 
they are established through the dynamic benchmarking process and because they change 
through unilateral implementation.   
 Summary.  The combined effect of these learning by monitoring institutions is a 
robust governance system.  When used together, these three mechanisms allow 
collaborative partners the flexibility91 necessary to adapt to the twin volatilities of 
innovation and market.  As the parties learn together, they provide the information 
necessary for effective monitoring of the collaboration; this monitoring allows further 
                                                 
90 MacDuffie, supra note __, [get pin cite] [1997]; see also Sabel, supra note __, [Theory of a Real-Time 
Revolution].  See also Finkel, Robert M., Crafting Statements of Work and Service Levels, in Delaney, 
John F. and William A. Tanenbaum, eds., THE OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2003: PROTECTING CRITICAL 
BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 177 (2003) (“Supplier should be responsible for performing a root cause analysis of 
failures, including: identifying the cause of the failure, recommending procedures for correcting the failure, 
correcting the failure, and providing assurance that the failure will not recur.”). 
91 For the importance of flexibility and the methods by which firms seek it, see Delaney, John F. and Ruth 
Ann Keene, Outsourcing Transactions: Strategies for Success, in Delaney, John F., William A. Tanenbaum, 
James E. Meadows, and William G. Roche, eds., THE OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2004: PROTECTING 
CRITICAL BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 18 (2004). 
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learning, thus leading to collaborative growth.  The change endemic to such creative 
relationships is harnessed through a mix of dynamic rules and flexible enforcement.   
New Rules: Pragmatic Governance Mechanisms as Practical Imperatives  
 Pragmatic governance re-conceives “rules.”  Since behavior in these 
collaborations is, first, defined with reference to possibilities defined without direct 
reference to parties’ utilities and, second, changed through unilateral error-correction 
mechanisms rather than formal negotiation, these rules are different from our traditional 
conception of a “rule” as a static, definite command (e.g. repair the mill shaft, deliver the 
cotton shipment, give me the deed to your farm).  Rather, these rules are indeterministic, 
temporal, and set with the expectation that they will change.  One might reasonably 
wonder how such rules, so conceived, bind anyone to do anything.  After all, even though 
the pragmatic mechanisms discussed above create an information-rich environment, they 
do not, by nature, provide hard measures against which to compare that information.   
 Thinking of pragmatic governance mechanisms as outlines for creating a joint 
praxis suggests a source for these mechanisms’ authority.  Rules’ compelling force 
emerges as parties’ joint exploration becomes a structure of shared knowledge.92  From 
this structure, a logic internal to the collaboration emerges.93  As the discipline develops, 
collaborators adhere to its steps (“carry out” the practice) according to the emerging 
internal logic:  i.e. this logic becomes the measure for performance.  The practice’s logic 
is not only a processual measure (i.e. whether one is going through the motions of the 
                                                 
92 Reckwitz, Andreas, “Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing,” 5 
European Journal of Social Theory 243, 246 (2002)(“Social order then does not appear as a product of 
compliance of mutual normative expectations, but embedded in collective cognitive and symbolic 
structures, in a ‘shared knowledge’ which enables a socially shared way of ascribing meaning to the 
world.”).  
93 Id. at 254 (“Every practice implies a particular routinized mode of intentionality, i.e., of wanting or 
desiring certain things and avoiding others.”). 
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practice) but also a substantive one: participants within the practical social structure are 
measured by whether they achieve the practice’s maturing objectives.  Here we come full 
circle: although parties in an innovative collaboration cannot define concrete performance 
rules ex ante, they create practical routines that crystallize parties’ emerging interests.  In 
this way, experimentation becomes order. 
 Praxis as governance mechanism is of particular conceptual importance in regards 
to the issue of transactional decontextualization.  As argued above, innovation divorces a 
transaction from the context of parties’ prior production experience.  Pragmatic 
governance mechanisms recontextualize the transaction by enveloping it within the 
parties’ newly-created, shared practical discipline.  That this recontextualization occurs 
within the bounds of the contract will have important consequences for our normative 
theories of contract enforcement, to be explicated in Part V below. 
 Also, conceptualizing pragmatic governance’s rules as constituting a practice 
indicates the relationship of this governance mechanism to the other two forms discussed 
above: economists’ explicit control rights and relationalists’ social norms.  First, 
pragmatic mechanisms provide contractible terms where traditional, static contract terms 
are inoperable.  In other words, a pragmatic governance mechanism is something you can 
put in a contract and expect the other party to perform (according to the praxis’ unfolding 
logic) when decision rights are too clumsy.  Second, these practices eventually create the 
norms that relationally constrain opportunism between parties when there are no external 
sources of such norms.94  As such, pragmatic mechanisms fill a theoretical blind-spot 
between thinking of agents either as perfectly autonomous agents or as norm-confined 
                                                 
94 Helper et al., supra note __, [get pin cite]. 
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conformists.95  Thus, the theory of pragmatic control presented here is complementary to 
standard theories of incomplete contracting. 
 
B. Evidence 
1. The stylized characteristics of pragmatic governance mechanisms 
 The first step in pragmatic governance is to define the benchmarking process.96  
I.e. pragmatic governance mechanisms identify any metrics and timeframe upon which 
the benchmarking analysis will focus.97  Then, these contracts prescribe the scope of the 
benchmarking processes: e.g. whether the parties’ search should focus on particular peers 
or a more general examination of the entire market.98  Finally, they locate the 
benchmarking metrics within a loose development plan99 and incentivize production 
through targets, or “milestones.”100  These plans and targets are usually transformational 
in design—i.e. their goal is to realize a rapid introduction of new technologies or 
processes and/or enter a new market.101  In short, benchmarking is the process by which 
performance rules are discovered. 
                                                 
95 Reckwitz, supra note __, at 256. 
96 A model search benchmarking clause: “Customer and Vendor shall jointly implement the objective 
benchmarking measurement and comparison process described in Exhibit __ in order to ensure that Vendor 
provides Customer with [unit pricing], [technology], [and service levels] equal to or greater than other 
organizations receiving similar services.”  Halvey and Melby, supra note ___, at 426 (bracketed text in the 
original). 
97 Finkel, supra note __, at 162; see also Ray, Ellen G., Scope of Services and Service Levels in Outsourcing 
Revolution 2004 543 (2004) (indicating that industry benchmarks are used for setting “specific 
performance metrics”). 
98 Id. at 687-688.   
99 Halvey and Melby, supra note ___, at 449; Gullikson, Rosemary, Scope of Services and Service Levels: 
Anatomy of a Statement of Work in Outsourcing Revolution 2004 595 (2004).  This largely depends upon 
whether the metrics are quantifiable or not, as quantification lends itself to broader comparison. 
100 Id. at 695.  See also Ray, Ellen G., Scope of Services and Service Levels in Outsourcing Revolution 
2004 547 (2004) (“Service Levels should be designed to incent desired behavior”). 
101 Ray, Ellen G., Scope of Services and Service Levels in Outsourcing Revolution 2004 533 (2004).  For a 
more thorough discussion of transformation, see also Halvey John K. and Barbara Murphy Melby, 
Information Technology Outsourcing Transactions: Process, Strategies, and Contracts 441-461 (2005). 
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 Second, pragmatic governance mechanisms provide the necessary conditions for 
simultaneous engineering to occur.  They provide for the integration of the collaborative 
efforts of both teams into each other’s current operations.  Also, they create the necessary 
proximity, often through directly teaming collaborators’ employees together102 but also 
through establishing advanced IT networks between collaborators.103  All this allows the 
collaboration to progress in lock-step fashion.   
 Third, pragmatic governance mechanisms define the institutions for error 
detection and correction.  They establish an oversight body, often a committee, that 
oversees rule adjustments.104  This committee is staffed by an equal number of 
representatives from each collaborator105 and is tasked with creating a production plan, 
setting benchmarks and incentives, and problem-solving.106  Also, these contracts create a 
reporting regimen between the collaborators and the oversight committee.107  Finally, 
they oblige collaborators to follow particular error detection and correction techniques, 
such as root cause analysis,108 “continuous improvement,”109 quality “ratchets,”110 etc.111  
                                                 
102 See e.g., the Cisco – KPMG Contract: 
Cisco shall provide a single point of contact in the field for KPMG representatives to enable real-
time field interaction. KPMG shall provide personnel to match up with Cisco's existing Offer 
Integration Team ("OIT") to prepare joint responses to customer [requests].   
Cisco, Inc. & KPMG contract of 29 Dec 1999, §4.3 available at http://contracts.onecle.com/bearingpoint/ 
cisco.collab.1999.12.29.shtml. 
103 See, e.g., deCODE and Massachusetts General Hospital contract of 11 May 2000, §4, available at 
http://contracts.onecle.com/decode/partners.saa.2000.05.11.shtml (creating an IT “bridge,” called the 
“Crosswalk Project,” to facilitate real-time collaboration between partners located on two continents). 
104 Kimball, George, Governance and Dispute Resolution: Making it Work in Outsourcing Revolution 2005 
473-475 (2005).  In contracts where a committee is not formed, a regular meeting structure between 
identified officers is set forth. 
105 “[B]oth vendor and customer have an interest in being sure the vendor delivers the services in 
accordinance with the definitive agreement… [thus] performance [should] be monitored by both parties.” 
Ray, supra note ___, at 540. 
106 See Finkel, supra note ___, at 170.  See also Nathanson, supra note ___, at 398.  
107 Kimball, supra note ___, at 686; Finkel, supra note ___, at 178.   
108  Halvey and Melby, supra note ___, at 424; Ray, supra note ___, at 556. 
109Nathanson, supra note __, at 392; Finkel, supra note ___, at 170; Ray, supra note ___, at 557. 
110 Kimball, supra note ___, at 694. 
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Thus, since change is impossible to determine ex ante, these contracts create institutions 
that, at least, harness it.   
2. New Wine in Old Bottles: The Relationship Between Explicit and Pragmatic Terms 
 As mentioned above, the contracts incorporating pragmatic governance are a 
mixture of both new and old.  They blend traditional control rights with pragmatic 
mechanisms.  This paper conceives this hybridization in terms similar to Klein’s112—i.e. 
the traditional explicit terms complement the pragmatic governance mechanisms.  For 
instance, a Cisco-KPMG agreement contains a section on non-solicitation: the parties are, 
first, prohibited from raiding entire groups from one another113 and, second, required to 
notify one another if they are going to make an offer of employment to the other’s 
employee.114  These explicit rules—or control rights—complement the simultaneous 
engineering provisions within the contract.115  Another example is transition and unwind 
terms, which provide a stable process by which the collaborators can initially engage with 
each other and, if necessary, decouple.  These explicit transition and unwind terms allow 
unrelated partners to consummate quickly a close cooperative relationship.116  In 
summary, we see that traditional terms in these contracts complement the pragmatic 
governance systems.  First, they define the scope and arc of the collaboration through 
                                                                                                                                                 
111 There are many other terms for this improvement process.  The basic idea is that pragmatic governance 
mechanism will require the “[v]endor [to] perform on-going performance measurement during the term to 
identify opportunities for improvement.” Hall, Thomas L. and Wanji Walcott, Outsourcing in the Financial 
Services Industry: A Mock Negotiation in Outsourcing Revolution 2004 847 (2004). 
112 Klein, supra note ___. 
113 Cisco-KPMG contract, supra note ___, §7.2. 
114 Id. §7.1. 
115 For terms outlining the collaboration’s simultaneous engineering aspects, see §4.2 of the contract.  Id.  
116 Delaney and Keene, supra note ___, 56 (2004) (“two of the most crucial periods in an outsourcing 
relationship are start of services (“Transition”) and migration away from the vendor at the end of the 
outsourcing arrangement (“Unwind”)). 
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transition and unwind terms.  Second, they apportion control rights in a way that supports 
pragmatic governance.  These contracts are hybrids: one foot in the old, one in the new. 
3. Four Industry Case Studies 
 To illustrate the varieties of pragmatic governance in detail, case studies from 
four new economy industries are presented below.  Contracts publicly available on the 
www.onecle.com website, a free online continuing legal education database, provided the 
data for the case studies.117  The industries examined are electronics manufacturing, 
informational technology outsourcing, biopharmaceutical research & development, and 
disposable container manufacturing.  While these four sectors share characteristics 
indicative of the new economy (pressure to innovate, high speed of technological 
development, volatile markets, outsourced production, extensive collaboration, etc.), they 
are different enough to show that pragmatic governance contracting is not an isolated 
phenomenon in a peculiar sub-economy.  Rather, this new approach to contracting 
appears commonplace among 21st century firms. 
The Apple Computer, Inc. and SCI Systems, Inc. Contract.  
As discussed in Part II, Apple Computer and SCI Systems,118 a “turnkey” or 
contract manufacturing firm, entered into an agreement that outsourced Apple’s computer 
manufacturing to SCI.  Apple agreed to turn its Fountain, CO manufacturing facility over 
to SCI in return for collaborative production.119  To launch this collaborative relationship, 
                                                 
117 All of these contracts are also available through the SEC’s EDGAR portal; however, the Lexis 
EDGARPlus database provides easier search capabilities.  Similar to www.onecle.com, the University of 
Missouri-Columbia also has a portal with over 89,000 searchable contracts available at 
http://cori.missouri.edu/. 
118 SCI Systems is now Sanmina-SCI Corporation.  See Sanmina-SCI, Annual Report 2005, available at 
http://www.shareholder.com/sanm/downloads/Sanmina-Sci_Prospectus2005.pdf, at 19.  
119 Apple Computer, Inc. & SCI-Systems, Inc., Manufacturing Agreement of May 31, 1996, available at 
http://contracts.onecle.com/apple/scis.mfg.1996.05.31.shtml. (“SCI will purchase Apple’s manufacturing 
facility located at 702 Bandley Drive, Fountain, Colorado (“Fountain”) and certain related assets.  The 
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the firms drafted a contract with a pragmatic governance mechanism.  This contract was 
chosen as the lead-off case study since it provides a complete example of an agreement 
integrating all three elements of pragmatic governance.  The contract is especially 
noteworthy, however, for its robust error detection and correction regime. 
 First, the parties set out the benchmarking process.  The general benchmarking 
metrics were defined: production would be benchmarked against measures of quality, 
price, time, and flexibility.120  These benchmarks were then integrated into jointly 
developed Product Plans.121  Where innovations in either product or process were 
necessary, new plans were to be drawn up.122  SCI was also required to develop a plan for 
meeting the particular shipping requirements of Apple’s just-in-time inventory system.123  
This benchmarking system was incentivized through a milestone structure where SCI was 
rewarded for innovating solutions to production problems.124 
                                                                                                                                                 
parties desire that Apple engage SCI to assemble, test and package certain Products, Service Units and 
Spare Parts, as defined below, on a turnkey basis at Fountain on the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement.”). 
120 Id. at §3.2 (“Apple’s Percentage Volume Commitment is conditioned upon and subject to: (i) SCI 
offering and delivering Products with comparable quality, and with competitive pricing, Lead Time and 
flexibility terms, when compared with other suppliers located in the United States who provide a 
comparable range of contract manufacturing and engineering services similar to those SCI provides in 
connection with Products.”). 
121 Id. at §4.1 (“Apple and SCI will establish a Product plan, in the format and containing the information 
set forth in Exhibit A, for each Product to be manufactured under the Agreement.”). 
122 Id. at §4.1 (“The parties may add new Products to this Agreement after the Closing Date by adding 
Product Plans for such Products, executed by both parties and in the format and containing the information 
set forth in Exhibit A, as addenda to Exhibit A.”). 
123 Id. at §9.3 (“Ship to Stock/Ship to Distribution.  This Agreement and the Pricing Schedules are based on 
the assumption that SCI can produce the Products at quality levels suitable for shipment directly to Apple's 
distribution system.  SCI's inability to achieve certification status as defined in Exhibit E, will create a 
significant increase in costs to Apple.  SCI will develop a plan to meet such requirements and understands 
that failure to achieve certification status within a reasonable time frame may result in disqualification as an 
approved Apple supplier.”). 
124 Id. at §5.3, especially (a)-(c) (“5.3 Progress Reports.  At Apple's request, SCI will provide Apple with 
regular written progress reports, such reports to include the following: 
 (a) status of progress toward next scheduled milestone; 
 (b) short description of problems, if any, in meeting such  
  milestone; 
 (c) recovery method proposed in order to meet the next milestone,  
  if needed;  
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 Second, the requirements for efficient simultaneous engineering were established.  
The parties were required to innovate production processes jointly in order to facilitate 
the turnkey production relationship.125  SCI was required to designate an engineer (or 
engineers) who would interface directly with Apple in designing testing processes.126  
These engineers were to be located on Apple’s premises in order to facilitate the testing 
collaboration.127  As noted before, the production was to use just-in-time inventory 
techniques, which necessarily require close and simultaneous cooperation.128  Apple was 
required to furnish forecasts so as to allow SCI to anticipate just-in-time production 
demand.129  Finally, the contract also outlined the simultaneous co-design process.130     
                                                                                                                                                 
 (d) any changes in the estimated Price of the Product; 
 (e) any other information related to the pre-production services  
  reasonably requested by Apple.”) 
125 Id. at §4.3 (“The parties will be jointly responsible for the identification of Pre-Production Services, the 
Pre-Production Delivery and Payment Schedule, Lead Time, Service Related Terms, Manufacturing 
Technology, Equipment, Labor, Materials and Facilities, Test Equipment and Fixtures, Tooling and other 
Product Specific Terms and Conditions.”) and §6 (“SCI will . . . purchase materials for, assemble, test and 
package such Products, Service Units and/or Spare Parts on a turnkey basis in accordance with Apple's 
Specifications and Quality Requirements, and Deliver them to Apple in accordance with the terms of this 
Agreement.”) (italics added). 
126 Id. at §5.2 (“SCI will name a test engineer, or more than one if Apple deems necessary and as mutually 
agreed, who will interface with Apple's test engineering group as needed to timely develop and/or support, 
as specified in the relevant Product Plan, Test Programs and Test Fixtures for use in manufacturing such 
Product for Apple.”). 
127 Id. (“Upon Apple's request, SCI will locate such test engineer(s) at Apple's engineering facilities.  Test 
engineers on Apple's premises will be subject to the provisions of Section 22.3 (Personnel), below.”). 
128 Id. at §7.1(a) (“Provided space is available at Fountain, any additional inventory owned by Apple and 
on-hand at Fountain on the Closing Date ("Additional Apple Inventory") will be kept in a separate cage at 
Fountain without charge to Apple, or at Apple's option at an offsite location, and purchased by SCI as 
required on a just-in-time basis until such inventory is either consumed in Products or redeployed by 
Apple.”) (italics added).  Furthermore, SCI was required to manage its inventory so that just-in-time 
production would flow smoothly, see Id. at §7.3(ii) (“that will ensure that SCI can fill Apple Purchase 
Orders on a turnkey basis according to the agreed upon Lead Times and flexibility terms and obtain 
competitive prices for such materials and components.”). 
129 Id. at §11.1 (“Forecasts.  Apple will provide SCI, every calendar month during the Term, a forecast 
covering the period of six (6) calendar months beginning with the month in which such forecast is 
provided.  Such forecast will specify the number of units of the Products which Apple anticipates 
purchasing during such six (6) month period.  Such forecasts will be non-binding and will not be regarded 
as a commitment to purchase by either party.”). 
130 Id. at §8, see discussion supra note ___. 
 37
 Third, an error detection and correction regime was established.  Each firm was 
required to appoint a project manager to oversee the collaboration.131  A robust reporting 
regime was then outlined: first, SCI was required to issue regular reports on production 
progress;132 second, SCI was required to report progress on inventory management;133 
and third, SCI had to report on the status of its half of the error detection and correction 
process.134 In turn, Apple was required to notify SCI immediately whenever an 
“Epidemic Failure” was discovered.135  Augmenting this reporting process was a two-step 
error detection regime, split between pre-production and post-production testing.  In pre-
production error detection, Apple personnel would, first, visit the facility regularly to 
discuss hiccups in the pre-production test process,136 and, second, collaborate with SCI in 
testing pre-production deliverables.137 When problems in pre-production were 
discovered, the parties would co-design reconfigurations to the process.138  A similar 
                                                 
131 Id. at §7.9 (“Each company will name a person to be a single point of contact to handle operational 
matters related to the day to day administration of this Agreement.”). 
132 Id. at §5.3 (“Progress Reports.  At Apple's request, SCI will provide Apple with regular written progress 
reports, such reports to include the following: (a) status of progress toward next scheduled milestone; (b) 
short description of problems, if any, in meeting such milestone; (c) recovery method proposed in order to 
meet the next milestone, if needed; (d) any changes in the estimated Price of the Product; (e) any other 
information related to the pre-production services reasonably requested by Apple.”). 
133 Id. at §7.7 (“Reports.  Upon request, SCI agrees to provide Apple written reports on Procured Materials, 
current inventory and scheduling in the format specified by Apple.  SCI will also authorize its suppliers to 
provide Apple information regarding the Procured Materials.”). 
134 Id. at §9.1 (“SCI will provide Apple regular reports and analysis of its yields, DPM and PPM.  SCI will 
also provide Apple, for Apple's review and approval, its corrective action procedures, defect containment 
plan, recall risks, repair capabilities and costs, business risk insurance, and known liabilities.”). 
135 Id. at §15.2 (“Apple will notify SCI whenever an Epidemic Failure is identified or suspected and work 
with SCI to develop a recovery plan, which may include a preventative action plan if appropriate under the 
circumstances.”). 
136 Id. at §5.4 (“Pre-Production Review.  Apple may conduct periodic reviews to ensure its satisfaction with 
SCI's pre-production services under each Product Plan.  Upon reasonable notice, SCI will allow Apple, 
during SCI's normal business hours, to visit its facility to discuss and inspect the status of pre-production.  
Apple personnel on SCI's premises will be subject to the provisions of Section 22.3 (Personnel), below.”). 
137 Id. at §5.5(a) (“Apple, with such assistance from SCI, as specified in the Product Plan, will examine and 
test each Pre-Production Deliverable to determine whether it conforms to the Specifications for such 
Deliverable set forth in the Product Plan within ten (10) working days after delivery to Apple.”). 
138 Id. at §5.6  (“Notice of Qualification.  After completing its Pre-Production Review and accepting all Pre-
Production Deliverables with respect to a Product, Apple will give SCI a written notice of qualification, 
attaching to the notice any modifications to the Specifications or any additions thereto, as agreed between 
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system was created for the actual manufacturing process: first, inspections, of both 
delivered and on-site product, were regularized;139 and second, the parties were to 
collaborate in the adjustment of any error-producing processes.140  Continuous 
improvement mechanisms were also included in the contract: first, product pricing was 
subject to a “stair step” process where the collaborators were required to innovate ways to 
decrease costs;141 and second, the parties agreed to meet regularly to create new methods 
for decreasing the lead time between order and delivery.142 
The Allstate Insurance Company and Acxiom Corporation Contract 
 The IT outsourcing contract between Allstate Insurance Company (“Allstate”) 
and Acxiom Corporation (“Acxiom”) provides another clear example of pragmatic 
governance.  Allstate is one of the largest insurance companies in the United States, with 
                                                                                                                                                 
Apple and SCI.  Such modifications and/or additions will be made part of the final Specification for such 
Product.  SCI will not implement any change to the final Specification without Apple's prior written 
consent.  Upon receipt of Apple's notice of qualification, SCI will be authorized to begin producing such 
Product for sale to Apple pursuant to the terms of this Agreement.”). 
139 For inspection of delivered product, see Id. at §9.2 (“Incoming Inspection”); for inspection of on-site 
product, see Id. at §9.4 (“On-site Inspections”). 
140 Id at §8 (8. DESIGN, MATERIAL AND PROCESS CHANGES. 
8.1 At SCI's Request.  SCI will not change any Product, including any component, material or 
process used in manufacturing such Product, without obtaining Apple's prior written consent . . . .  
SCI's request will include any cost, schedule or other impact of such change.  If Apple requests, 
SCI will also provide sample units of the modified Product for Apple's evaluation.  Apple will 
approve or disapprove SCI's request within thirty (30) days after receipt.    
8.2 At Apple's Request. Should Apple desire modifications in the design of a Product, Apple will 
submit a written Engineering Change Order ("ECO") to SCI.  Within one (1) week after SCI's 
receipt of the ECO, SCI will advise Apple of any cost, schedule or other impact of such change, 
and will not implement any such change unless and until Apple has approved such impact writing. 
8.3 Emergency Changes.  If Apple submits an emergency ECO clearly identified as such, SCI will 
implement such ECO as soon as possible; provided that SCI has advised Apple of and Apple has 
approved in writing any cost or other impact of such change. 
141 Id. at §10.6 (a) (“Apple and SCI will agree upon cost reduction goals with stair step costs reductions to 
be implemented over an agreed upon period of time.  These goals will be set forth in the Product Plan.”) 
and (b) (“SCI will meet with Apple every three (3) months during the Term to review the existing Product 
cost and establish a plan to pursue all reasonable cost reduction opportunities.”).   
142 Id. at §11.7 (“Lead Time Reduction Program.  SCI and Apple will meet periodically to discuss options 
to effect reductions in Lead Times to allow improved flexibility in ordering and delivery.  The agenda for 
each meeting will include identification of such options, schedules for determination of associated cost and 
schedules for implementation.”). 
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2004 total revenues of $33.4 billion.143  Acxiom is a 37 year-old company that specializes 
in IT and business process outsourcing.144  This contract, a renegotiation of the original 
1992 agreement, continued Allstate and Acxiom’s collaboration in managing information 
between Allstate and its clients.145  To effectively manage the data, the parties 
constructed a pragmatic governance mechanism.  This contract was selected as a case 
study for two reasons: first, it provides an excellent example of formal search 
benchmarking being used to set performance imperatives; and, second, its error detection 
and correction mechanism includes a robust ratchet clause.   
 First, Allstate and Acxiom established the benchmarking process.  Initial metrics 
for benchmarking, called “minimum acceptable service levels,” were described.146  These 
metrics fit into a broader “continuing benchmarking program” that Acxiom was required 
to draft.147  “Benchmark prices” were also used: historical data from the parties’ 
                                                 
143 Allstate Annual Report 2004, at 51, available at http://www.allstate.com/investor/annual_report/ 
2004/pdf/2005_ALL_anl_mtg_mtl.pdf. 
144 http://www.acxiom.com/default.aspx?ID=1640&DisplayID=18 (“Founded in 1969, Acxiom is 
headquartered in Little Rock, Arkansas, with locations throughout the United States, and in the United 
Kingdom, France, Australia, and Japan.”). 
145 Allstate Insurance Company & Acxiom Corporation contract of March 1999, §1, available at 
[hereinafter the “Allstate Contract”].  Since the agreement is for data management and not the maintenance 
of the actual IT network, this contract can be considered an instance of business process outsourcing also.  
Still, the IT service of the IT network is implicit in the contract, thus the differentiation between the two 
categories of outsourcing agreements is meaningless here. 
146 Id. at §4.1(“Schedule 4.1 specifies certain MASLs.  The initial MASLs for those Services previously 
provided under the PSA and not specified in Schedule 4.1 shall be the higher (i.e., the more beneficial to 
Allstate) of (i) the actual service levels provided immediately prior to the Effective Date or (ii) the MASLs, 
if any, previously specified for such services under the Prior Agreements.  All MASLs shall be subject to 
adjustment pursuant to this Section 4.”). 
147 Id. at §8.7 (“With Allstate's direction and cooperation, and as part of the Services, Acxiom shall propose 
and effect a continuing benchmarking program and methodology acceptable to Allstate that takes into 
consideration adjustments, if any, for reasonably comparable elements of the Services and that will enable 
Allstate to compare the fees and MASLs set forth in this Agreement with an annually updated database of 
peer companies and ensure that said fees and MASLs are aligned with the industry's best rates and practices 
and appropriate adjustments to meet such industry best rates and practices shall be made annually as a 
Contract Change.  At Allstate's direction, Acxiom shall work with any benchmarking firm Allstate 
selects.”). 
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collaboration was the first source of pricing;148 however, where there was no data 
available (e.g. with innovated projects), the parties were to benchmark against industry 
practices through a quote mechanism.149  The scope of future projects was set forth along 
with the process for introducing them into the overarching plan.150   
 Second, the necessary conditions for simultaneous engineering were contracted.  
The parties were required to collaborate in innovating projects that would achieve 
Allstate’s objectives.151  Acxiom was given the access to Allstate’s processes and 
personnel necessary for effective collaboration.152  Specific terms for Acxiom’s access to 
Allstate’s network were set out.153  Furthermore, the specific databases upon which the 
parties would collaborate were set out in an exhibit (which was subject to change)154 and 
                                                 
148 Id. at §8.2.2.1 (“For types of data previously obtained directly by Allstate, the Benchmark Price shall be 
the average price paid by Allstate for such data during the twelve (12) month period prior to Acxiom's 
taking responsibility for the acquisition of such data.”) (italics added). 
149 Id. at §8.2.2.2 (“For types of data for which no historical pricing information is available (e.g., new 
types of data), the parties shall endeavor, in good faith, to agree upon a Benchmark Price. In the event that 
the parties are unable to mutually agree upon a Benchmark Price, a request for quote will be sent out with 
volume estimates supplied and the response to such request will be used as the benchmark.”). 
150 Id. at §3.4 (“From the Effective Date, Acxiom shall perform such additional projects, relating to the 
Services ("Projects") in the area of data acquisition, data processing, information management, 
professional consulting, system design and development, software maintenance, programming, and 
software acquisition, as Allstate may request and Acxiom may agree from time to time.  Projects may be 
requested orally unless required to be specified in Work Orders pursuant to the procedures set forth in 
Section 9.5, below; provided, however, that once any oral request has been agreed upon, written 
documentation evidencing such agreement shall be executed by the Parties as promptly as possible prior to 
the inception of any work on such Project.”) (italics added). 
151 Id. at §7.1 (“Acxiom shall cooperate with Allstate and provide Allstate with advice, information, and 
assistance in identifying and defining data management requirements to meet Allstate’s business 
objectives.”). 
152 Id. at §7.2 (“Allstate shall reasonably cooperate with Acxiom in all matters relating to Acxiom’s 
performance of the services.  Such cooperation shall include (but not be limited to) reasonable access to 
Allstate’s administrative, technical, and other similar personnel as reasonably by Acxiom to provide the 
Services.”). 
153 Id. at §9.2.1 (“[Allstate’s] computer data and software shall be used by Acxiom Personnel only in 
connection with Acxiom’s obligations hereunder.  Failure of Acxiom to comply with these rules may result 
in Allstate restricting offending personnel from access to Allstate computer systems or data….”). 
154 Id. at §5.1 (“Schedule 5.1 is a listing of such resources to be provided by Allstate in connection with the 
provisions of data interactively.”). 
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the network through which the parties would cooperate was determined.155  Thus, the 
basic proximity necessary for simultaneous engineering was established.  
 Third, the parties outlined the error detection and correction mechanism.  
Although a joint committee was not established, both parties dedicated contract managers 
with decision-making authority to the collaboration.156  A system of reporting, to be 
repeated monthly if not more frequently, was established: “Acxiom shall promptly inform 
Allstate of any deficiencies, omissions, or irregularities in Allstate's requirements or in 
Acxiom's performance of the Services that may come to Acxiom's attention.”157  The 
Acxiom and Allstate contract managers were to meet at least quarterly to review 
Acxiom’s performance against the minimum acceptable service levels.158  A ratcheting 
mechanism was implemented to secure better performance in light of changing 
benchmark indicators: 
MASLs shall be adjusted by written agreement of the Parties from time to time, 
but not less frequently than at the end of each anniversary of the Effective Date, to 
be made higher or more stringent so as to reflect changes in technology, changes 
in Allstate's business and environment, and other changes in circumstances.  
Acxiom shall use commercially reasonable efforts to improve its performance in 
relation to the MASLs over the Term, through the implementation of efficiency-
enhancing hardware and software technologies.159 
 
                                                 
155 The “IBM Global Network.”  Id. at §5.3 
156 Id. at §9.1.2. (“Allstate’s Contract Manager shall act as the primary liaison between Allstate and 
Acxiom’s Contract Manager and shall have overall responsibility for directing all of Allstate’s activities 
hereunder and shall be vested with all necessary authority to fulfill that responsibility.”). 
157 Id. at §15.1. 
158 Id. at §4.2 (“Acxiom shall meet with Allstate's Contract Manager at least quarterly to review Acxiom's 
actual performance against the MASLs and shall recommend remedial actions to resolve performance 
deficiencies.”). 
159 Id. at §4.3 (italics added). 
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At the same time, if an Allstate error caused Acxiom to miss a benchmark, then that 
particular service level would be temporarily suspended.160  Thus, a flexible system of 
error detection and correction was established. 
The Coca-Cola Company and Senomyx, Inc. Contract 
The Coca-Cola Company (“Coke”), the food and beverage giant, entered into a 
collaboration and licensing agreement with Senomyx, a biotech R&D firm, for the 
purpose of producing new compounds that enhanced the taste of Coke’s products.161  To 
achieve this objective, the firms negotiated a contract with a pragmatic governance 
mechanism.  This contract was selected as a case study to illustrate simultaneous 
engineering: Coke and Synomyx established the conditions for intimate collaboration. 
First, the contract established the benchmarking process.  A set of targets were 
established according to a mutually agreed upon “Annual Research Plan.”162  Due to 
uncertainty, the parties were only able to approximate compounds that might possibly be 
relevant according to general product criteria Coke thought “may be important.”163  
Collaborative experimentation was required to “design and discover” new approaches.164  
As experimentation progressed, further benchmarks were set through the Research 
Steering Committee165 following a series of progressive milestones.166   
                                                 
160 Id. at §4.4 (“In the event, and to the extent, that Acxiom fails to meet a specific MASL as a consequence 
of material errors or omissions of Allstate or its employees, contractors, or agents, such MASL will be 
temporarily suspended for such reasonable amount of time as is necessary for Acxiom to return to 
compliance, provided that Acxiom shall use its best efforts to return to compliance.  Acxiom shall take such 
reasonable precautions as it deems necessary to prevent the recurrence of any such event.”) (italics added). 
161 Coca-Cola Company & Senomyx, Inc. Contract of 22 April 2002, §2, available at http://contracts. 
onecle.com/senomyx/coca-cola.collab.2002.04.22.shtml. 
162 Id. at §4.2(v), §5. 
163 Id. at Appendix B. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at §4.2. 
166 Id. at §9.3. 
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Second, the conditions for simultaneous engineering were enumerated.  Coke’s 
research on beverage bases and Senomyx’s research on enhanced compounds was to 
progress lock-step.167  Furthermore, each party was required to discuss the research with 
the other party at regular intervals, through both face-to-face meetings and 
telecommunication.168  The following selection, which illustrates one segment of the 
parties’ initial Research Plan, illustrates the close simultaneous cooperation:169 
[Coke] 
 
1. Provide SENOMYX 
with [***]. 
2. Collaborate with 














1. Prepare [***]. 
2. Perform [***] according 
to agreed [***]. 
3. Perform [***] and other 
relevant tests [***]. 
4. Conduct [***] for 
certain compounds. 
 
Third, error detection and correction mechanisms were organized.  The 
aforementioned Research Steering Committee, which was to oversee the research and to 
monitor progress, was the heart of the problem-solving regime.170  Furthermore, the 
Steering Committee was tasked with designing the “protocol” by which progress was 
measured.171  To facilitate error detection and correction, both parties were required to 
report on research progress regularly.172  And finally, the parties included a ratchet 
                                                 
167 Id. at §4.2(iv) (“[The Steering Committee will] communicate [with the parties] during the 
Commercialization Period regarding the development of Selected Compound(s) and the commercialization 
of Beverages and Beverage Bases incorporating Selected Compounds.”). 
168 Id. at §4.6, Appendix B. 
169 Id. at Appendix B. 
170 Id. at §4.2(i) (“[Steering Committee will] provide strategic direction and performance criteria for the 
Collaborative R&D Program”),(ii) (“[Steering Committee will] monitor progress and communicate status 
of the Collaborative R&D Program”), and (v) (“[Steering Committee will] review and amend if necessary 
the Research Plan and the Development Plan”).  
171 Id. at §4.2(vii)(“[The Steering Committee will] establish the protocol for determining the enhancement 
level of Enhancing Compounds, and Selected Compounds, and agree on the level of enhancement of 
Enhancing Compounds.”). 
172 Id. at Appendix B. 
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mechanism with the milestone scheme in order to cost-save and, by implication, reload 
the error detection/correction process.173  Progression through the milestones was subject 
to the Research Steering Committee’s review and approval.174 
The Sweetheart Cup Company and Earthshell Container Corporation Contract 
 The “Operating Agreement for the Production of Hinged Sandwich Containers for 
McDonald’s Corporation”175 between the large disposable container producer Sweetheart 
Cup Company, Inc. and Earthshell Container Corporation, a niche producer of 
environmentally-friendly packaging, sets the parameters for the co-production of 600 
million Big Mac boxes.  The primary reason the parties used pragmatic governance: to 
innovate cost reduction processes.  Because making cardboard boxes for the fast-food 
industry is a classic “old economy” business, this is perhaps the most interesting case 
study of all.   
 An overarching “Economic Model” served as the key benchmarking tool in the 
contract.  The Model set flexible performance goals along with measurement 
standards.176  Interestingly, things were so uncertain at the time the contract was finalized 
that the parties benchmarked the type and quantity of manufacturing equipment to be 
                                                 
173 Id. at §9.4.2. 
174 Id. at §9.3. 
175 Sweetheart – Earthshell Contract, available at http://contracts.onecle.com/earthshell/ 
sweetheart.op.1997.10.16.shtml (last visited 30 May 2006). 
176 Unfortunately, the appendices to the contract were not included in the filing.  The contract itself only 
described the Economic Model in general terms: 
 2.2. ECONOMIC MODEL.  The Parties have attached hereto as Exhibit A, a redacted version of 
 the economic model, dated October __, 1997 (the "Economic Model"), that illustrates, on a 
 hypothetical basis, the expected revenue and cost components for the annual production and sale 
 of approximately 600 million units of Big Mac sandwich containers.  The Economic Model 
 assumes that each Line of Equipment will be tooled for and dedicated to produce that container.  
 The price set forth in Economic Model is subject to adjustment to reflect changes in Product 
 specifications or processing conditions from those set forth in the original Contract. 
Sweetheart – Earthshell Contract, s2.2, supra note ___. 
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used.177  The contract set benchmarks for both production (e.g. “Model Efficiency 
Levels”)178 personnel expertise.179  Finally, the contract created a management committee 
to oversee the adjustment of benchmarks and outlined those “fundamental business 
strategies” that would be determined through joint agreement.180  Thus, the parties 
operated within a system of flexible rules. 
 Second, the parties created the conditions necessary for simultaneous engineering.  
Foremost in this regard, the contract provided for the co-location of personnel.181  Also 
facilitating simultaneous engineering were regular meetings between the parties’ 
managers.182  Thus, the parties were working side by side on the manufacture of the 
containers. 
 Third, the contract set forth a host of error detection and correction mechanisms.  
The general error detection and correction procedure allowed for a party to replace 
inefficient equipment as long as the substitution did not disrupt production and as long as 
greater efficiency levels were met.183  Because the production equipment was being 
leased to Sweetheart, the contract provided that any modifications performed on the 
equipment would revert to Earthshell upon termination.184  Finally, the contract tasked 
the joint management committee to oversee error correction.185 
                                                 
177 Id. at 4.1(a) (“The items of Equipment expected to comprise the Initial Lines are described generally in 
the Economic Model....”). 
178 Id. at s4.1(b). 
179 Id. at 5.1(b). 
180 Id. at 8.2-3.   
181 Id. at §3.1(c) (“ECC personnel or consultants will be permitted access to the Facility and shall be  
provided office space during the Pre Start Date Period as is reasonably necessary in order for them to fulfill 
ECC's obligations or protect its rights under this Agreement or the Ancillary Agreements.”). 
182 Id. at 8.2. 
183 Id. at 4.1(e) and 4.2(c). 
184 Id. at 4.7. 
185 Id. at 8.2(a). 
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 While the pragmatic governance elements to this contract may not be as extreme 
as those found in, say, life sciences research collaborations, the Sweetheart–Earthshell 
agreement illustrates the reach of this organizational innovation.  Even firms in 
traditional industries are innovating collaboratively.  This leads us to wonder just how far 
this governance trend has spread throughout the greater economy. 
4. Aggregate Data 
 To complement the detailed case studies, samples from three industries above186 
and a control group were coded for evidence of pragmatic governance.  The coding 
process involved searching individual contracts for keywords indicative of each of the 
three pragmatic governance elements.187  To form the samples for the coding, contracts 
from the www.onecle.com database were slotted into one of four industry categories: 
biopharmaceutical collaborations, software development, electronics manufacturing, or 
traditional supply contracts (the control group).  Then, about 25 contracts (depending 
upon availability) were randomly chosen within each category to form a sample for 
analysis (the randomly chosen contracts were filtered to make sure no single firm was a 
                                                 
186 Information Technology Outsourcing was not included simply because a sufficient number of contracts 
were not to be found.  In its place, contracts from the Software Development industry were analyzed.  
Disposable Container Packaging was lumped together with other traditional businesses to form a control 
group. 
187 Nine keywords were chosen for each category.  For benchmarking, the following words were selected: 
“milestone,” “plan,” “proposal,” “service level,” “benchmark,” “target,” “deliverable,” “deadline,” 
“timetable.”  For error detection and correction: “committee,” “program manager,” “contract manager,” 
“continuous improvement,” “root cause,” “problem,” “oversee,” “progress,” “analysis.”  Finally, for 
simultaneous engineering: “interface,” “premises,” “just-in-time,” “forecast,” “pair,” “lead time.” Three 
word combinations were also chosen for simultaneous engineering: “joint + [activity]” (e.g. “joint 
development,” “joint production,” “joint marketing,” etc., but not “joint ownership,” “joint venture,” etc.), 
“co-[activity]” (e.g. “co-design,” “co-production,” “co-authorship,” etc.), and “grant w/s access” (e.g. 
“party A grants party B access to its databases . . .”).  Furthermore, keywords—such as “plan,” “proposal,” 
“interface,” “committee,” “problem,” “progress,” “analysis,” “premises,” and “pair”—with other common 
meanings were subjected to a second round of contextual analysis to make sure they were actually being 
used within the learning by monitoring logic.  This is admittedly a subjective process; however, it was 
conducted conservatively (i.e. if there was doubt as to the use of the word, it was considered not evidence 
of learning by monitoring) to avoid false positives.  All of the coding was conducted using the content 
search (aka “Find”) function on the Firefox web browser. 
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party to more than one contract in the sample).  The following descriptive statistics, the 
results of this admittedly elementary analysis,188 reveal a strong trend towards pragmatic 
governance in the three new economy industries: 
 
The stark difference between the three new economy industries and the control group are 
easily seen in the graphical illustration of the table above: 
 
                                                 




# of contracts w/ 
all 3 categories 
# of contracts 
w/ 2 categories
# of contracts 
with 1 category 
# of contracts 
w/ 0 category
Biopharmaceutical 
R&D 27 19 (70.00%) 5 (18.52%) 3 (11.11%) 0
Software Develop. 21 17 (80.95%) 4 (19.05%) 0 0
Electronic 
Manufacturing 
Services 25 16 (64.00%) 6 (24.00%) 1 (4.00%) 0
Traditional 












Experimentalist Contracting across Four Industries
# of contracts w/ 0
# of contracts with 1
# of contracts w/ 2
# of contracts w/ all 3 
 
A clear majority of firms in the new economy samples employ pragmatic 
governance: 70% of biopharmaceutical research and development agreements included 
all three major elements of pragmatic governance, nearly 81% of software development 
contracts, and 64% of agreements for electronics manufacturing services.  No contract in 
any of the three new economy samples failed to evidence one of the categories.  Indeed, 
every software development contract coded included at least two categories.  The control 
group’s results suggest that the coding methodology is reliable.189  What is especially 
interesting about the control group—a collection of traditional supply contracts, ranging 
from crude oil to beer bottles—is that three of these contracts incorporated pragmatic 
governance.  Thus, we see further evidence of this type of contracting venturing beyond 
its home territory as pressures to innovate expand to “old” economy industries. 
 
IV. The law governing this transactional behavior 
                                                 
189 Admittedly, more robust examination, with larger samples and more sophisticated content analysis, is 
necessary; the data here is to be taken simply as strongly suggestive. 
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Having theorized firms’ behavior, we must now examine the institutions that 
support this activity.  In this section it is argued that conventional court adjudication, 
which follows contextualist doctrines of contract interpretation, is inappropriate for 
innovative collaboration.  Contextualism’s reliance on generalized legal rules contradicts 
the innovative practices pursued in these collaborations.  Because contextualism 
misconceives collaboration’s nature, it becomes a hindrance to innovative activity.  In 
response, parties are crafting self-enforcement mechanisms in their contracts that are 
consistent with the pragmatic governance system described above.  Thus, the private bar 
is providing an example for potential reform, discussed in Part V, to follow.  
A. External enforcement 
Whereas parties’ internal dispute mechanisms are sensitive to innovation’s 
uncertainties, court enforcement of contracts ignores them.  Where the dispute concerns 
an alleged breach of a flexible rule, the traditional court is not an appropriate forum.  This 
is primarily because the courts’ approach to contract interpretation,190 as found in the 
UCC,191 is blind to these new mechanisms for governing innovation.  From the 
perspective of contemporary contract doctrine, pragmatic governance mechanisms appear 
ambiguous: vague language that imprecisely addresses contingencies and, thus, must be 
amended by the court.  Because the collaborators are innovating, however, the court will 
inevitably misconstrue the contract: it will rely on generalized rules based upon the very 
routines the collaborators are attempting to abandon.  Court interpretation is then a 
                                                 
190 This paper, following Farnsworth’s lead, does not differentiate between “interpretation” and 
“construction” though it acknowledges the difference.  Farnsworth, E. Allen, FARNSWORTH ON 
CONTRACTS, 2nd Ed. 256 (1998) (“This distinction between interpretation and construction is a difficult one 
to maintain in practice and will not be stressed here.”).  For present purposes, the differentiation between 
the two concepts is an unnecessary degree of nuance.   
191 This paper limits its analysis to the UCC for the sake of conceptual simplicity and due to its wide 
application.  The arguments here should still be highly suggestive when applied in the context of common 
law, Vienna Convention, or UNIDROIT enforcement. 
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constraint on innovation.  Furthermore, these contracts are gapless: the gaps between the 
explicit terms are filled through the pragmatic governance mechanisms.  Court gap-filling 
is then redundant, interfering where it should rather be enabling pragmatic governance 
mechanisms’ efforts to fill the gaps themselves.  The following section explicates these 
deficiencies and then gives a theory for why the UCC’s logic of enforcement cannot 
comport with innovative collaboration.   
2. Contextual Interpretation  
 Diagnosing the Problem 
Enforcement by traditional court litigation is inappropriate for pragmatic 
governance mechanisms because it is nearly impossible for courts to accurately ascertain 
the parties’ intent behind the contract.  Where the meaning of contract terms is contested 
or when the terms want for supplement,192 courts, per Llewellyn’s original 
prescription,193 have looked to the broader context of the agreement.  The logic is that 
using these additional sources of evidence will provide to courts a “foundation for 
determining the parties’ actual expectations and the bargain in fact.”194  Thus, courts refer 
to either the contracting parties’ past experience—via the doctrines of course of 
                                                 
192 Uniform Commercial Code, 2004 ed., §1-303(d)(“A course of performance or course of between the 
parties or usage of trade… is relevant in ascertaining the meaning of the parties’ agreement, may give 
particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement, and may supplement or qualify the terms of the 
agreement.”).  Note, however, that the UCC does not require in commercial contracts that the court 
determine whether the disputed contract term is excessively vague before referencing extrinsic evidence.  
Uniform Commercial Code, 2004 ed., §2-202(2)(“Terms in a record may be explained by evidence of 
course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade without a preliminary determination by the 
court that the language used is ambiguous”)(italics added). 
193 See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, “The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales,” 52 Harv. L. Rev. 873, 903-04 
(1939); Karl N. Llewellyn, “On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II,” 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341, 389 n124 
(1937). 
194 Kirst, Roger, “Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing: Subversion of the UCC Theory,” 1977 U. Ill. L. 
F. 811, 812 (1977).   
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dealing195 and course of performance196—or the industry’s past experience—via the 
doctrine of usage of trade.197    In either approach, contextualist enforcement yields false 
positives. 
Course of Performance/Dealing.  The problem with relying on parties’ course of 
performance or dealing to interpret parties’ intent is that much of this information is 
unverifiable.  I.e. courts have insufficient information from which to glean patterns in the 
disputants’ behavior.198  Although collaboration makes much information observable 
between the parties, it does not necessarily lead to verifiability.  When parties are 
constantly altering their behavior in order to solve emerging problems, consistent patterns 
remain elusive regardless of how detailed the information is.  Put another way: the 
abundance of information only means that the court will have to work that much harder 
to analyze it all; where judicial resources are scarce, there is no necessary reason that this 
analysis will be either thorough or probing.   
One might counterargue that reliance on expert testimony can compensate for the 
courts’ analytical handicaps.  This leads us to the second problem with contextualism’s 
                                                 
195 Uniform Commercial Code, 2004 ed., §1-303(b); see also UCC §2-202; Farnsworth, supra note __, at 
308-9. 
196 UCC §1-303(a); see also UCC §2-202; Farnsworth, supra note __, at 318-321. 
197 UCC §1-303(c).  See also UCC §2-202; Farnsworth, supra note __, at 309-18. The UCC uses the 
following hierarchy when interpreting contract terms: first, the explicit terms of agreement; second, course 
of performance; and, third, course of dealing and usage of trade.  UCC §1-303(e).   
198 Goetz and Scott, “The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interaction Between Express and 
Implied Contract Terms,” 73 Cal. L. Rev. 261, 275-6 (1985) (“The process of implying terms from more 
narrowly focused experiences places a significant stress on the state's interpretive process. Whereas the 
court generally infers alleged industry-wide trade practices from a considerable mass of behavioral data, the 
alleged patterns in the behavior of particular parties may be derived from a quite limited number of 
occurrences. The number of observations may be so small that an observer would have difficulty 
distinguishing valid inferences from spurious ones. Courts experience grave difficulty determining the 
degree of repetition necessary to establish a “course” of conduct.  Similarly, it may be difficult to determine 
whether a particular act sheds light on the ex ante meaning of the agreement or merely represents an ex post 
waiver of a term of the agreement. The finder of fact must engage in an error-prone inquiry whether the 
acts were ambiguous and, if not, whether they constitute a course of performance or waivers -- unpatterned 
instances from which no inferences can be drawn.”). 
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allowance of course of dealing/performance interpretation:  even if the parties’ activities 
are verifiable, the court will have to rely on generalized experience to understand the very 
facts upon which it is supposed to render its decision.   Due to the complexity of these 
collaborations, it is common and, after Kumho,199 entirely proper for courts to rely upon 
expert testimony to interpret facts.  Indeed, expert witnesses were used frequently in the 
litigated contract disputes between collaborators this author found.  Usually, they are 
used to opine on manufacturing processes or lost profits damages.  When doing so, 
experts use their wider experiences to make authoritative descriptions of the parties’ 
activities.200  Though expert testimony is often seen as a finer tool with which courts can 
parse litigants’ behavior, its reliance on generalization for its validity undermines its 
applicability where parties experiment.  Collaborators’ innovative approaches to high 
levels of uncertainty render the applicability of experts’ general experience suspect 
because the innovators are trying to transcend that general experience.  The “grave 
difficulty” courts have in “determining the degree of repetition necessary to establish a 
‘course’ of conduct” only becomes more pronounced.201   In terms of promoting 
innovation, these doctrines that courts consider tools are really stumbling-blocks. 
Trade Usage.  Using industry norms or “trade usage” is also problematic where 
parties are engaging in unique behavior in order to innovate and investing in highly 
relationship-specific activities.  There simply are no broad norms for the court to 
                                                 
199 Kumho Tire Company, et al. v. Patrick Carmichael etc., et al., 119 S.Ct. 1167 (1999) (Breyer).  
200 Hand, Learned, “Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testimony,” 15 Harv. L. 
Rev. 40, 54 (“The whole object of the expert is to tell the jury… general truths derived from his specialized 
experience.”). 
201 Goetz and Scott, supra note __, at 276. 
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reference.202  If relatively insular and established communities such as hay, grain and 
feed, textiles, and silk producers cannot agree on industry-wide norms,203 it is highly 
unlikely that volatile new economy industries are going to have identifiable “trade 
usages.”  A practitioner suggested as much in the context of describing how parties set 
the terms of their strategic alliances: “the nature of each alliance is so sui generis that 
there can be a seemingly infinite variety of combinations from which parties may select 
provisions for their alliance.”204  Thus, it is unlikely that courts will find commonly held 
trade usages that apply to a dispute between collaborative innovators,205 a likelihood that 
either puts more pressure on course of dealing/performance analysis or exposes 
collaborations to formalist contract interpretation.206  In the event that courts do think 
they can apply trade usage, they will only be able to clumsily interpret parties’ intentions 
through the dim lens of general experience.   
Examples.  The following cases, both disputes arising out of collaborative design 
and manufacturing agreements, illustrate the difficulties courts have in using 
contextualist principles to interpret contract terms. 
Motorola v. DBTel,207 a case still pending trial, is noteworthy in that it shows both 
contextualism’s failure and the court’s attempt to counteract that failure.  In 1998, 
Motorola and DBTel, which would become the largest contract manufacturer of mobile 
                                                 
202 Bernstein, Lisa, “The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary 
Study,” 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 710, 715 (1999) (arguing that industry norms “may not consistently exist, even 
in relatively close-knit merchant communities.”).   
203 Bernstein failed to find coalesced norms in these four industries.  Bernstein, Lisa "The Questionable 
Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study," 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 76 (1999). 
204 Kurtyka, Ruthanne, “The Way Out: Exiting the Strategic Alliance” in Structuring, Negotiating & 
Implementing Strategic Alliances 2000, James Ashe-Taylor and Kenneth A. Clarke, eds., Practicing Law 
Institute 285 (2000). 
205 Whether or not an industry norm applicable to a given contract exists is an issue of fact.  UCC §1-
303(c)(“The existence and scope of such usage must be proved as facts.”). 
206 The perils of formalist enforcement are discussed in Part V below. 
207 Motorola, Inc. v. DBTel, Inc. and D&B Holding Co. Ltd., No. 02 C 3336 (NDIL). 
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phones in Taiwan, agreed to collaborate in the design and manufacture of handsets.208  
DBTel made significant relationship-specific investments in order to collaborate with 
Motorola, including building an isolated annex to its Shanghai factory solely for 
Motorola production.209  Over a period of three years, the parties co-designed and 
manufactured several different handset models.210  Production proceeded along 
pragmatist principles, with the parties simultaneously engineering,211 setting 
benchmarks,212 and error detecting/correcting.213   
 Problems arose around the production of two models, the DB2009 and the 
“Taishan.”214  When Motorola cancelled orders for both models in late 2000 and early 
2001, DBTel requested permission to sell the handsets on the market.  Motorola refused, 
citing contractual exclusivity and trade secret provisions.215  DBTel argued that these two 
later handset models, for which separate contracts were signed, did not fall under the 
original agreement’s control and, thus, that it should be allowed to mitigate its losses.  
Motorola disagreed and filed to enjoin DBTel from selling either handset to Motorola’s 
competitors.    
                                                 
208 This was apparently part of Motorola’s plan to outsource 60% of its production capacity in order to cut 
costs and reach strategic Asian markets.  Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaims, paragraph 47. 
209 DBTel invested over $115 million to bring its Shanghai facility into line with Motorola’s requirements.  
Id., paragraph 54. 
210 Motorola v. DBTel [prelim injunction ruling] at 8 (“DBTEL did eventually assemble additional phone 
models for Motorola, and the parties agree (as do we) that the following models were covered [in addition 
to the original model, the “Sparky”] by the terms of the Agreement: Shark, Sporty, Sterling, Amio, Mod II 
and Angel.”).   
211 Complaint for Injunctive Relief and Damages, paragraph 3. 
212 For description of the design process, see Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaim, paragraph 53.   
213 For example, throughout the collaboration, DBTel strived to continually “shrink” components to make 
each subsequent handset model smaller than the first.  Motorola v. DBTel [prelim injunction ruling] at 38. 
214 The DB2009 was designed, using both Motorola and Phillips proprietary information, at Motorola’s 
request: the handset was to be sold under DBTel’s name in China so as to provide Motorola a way of 
selling phones above its quota.  DBTel radically altered the design for the “Shark” handset due to its poor 
performance in the Chinese market (it was, frankly, too sophisticated for the mainland networks) and 
renamed the model the “Taishan.”  Defendant’s Answer and Counterclaim, paragraph 53. 
215 Motorola v. DBTel [prelim injunction ruling] at 51. 
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 Therefore, the primary issue on Motorola’s request for a preliminary injunction 
was whether production of the DB2009 and the Taishan could be interpreted as falling 
under the original contract.216  If they did fall within the contract’s terms, then DBTel 
would be in breach, justifying a preliminary injunction.  Motorola’s petition failed, in 
large part because the magistrate court was unable to interpret the evidence.  In the 
court’s own words: 
Motorola's first problem is that the evidence it adduced regarding what its 
trade secrets and confidential information are and how they were used by 
DBTEL is confusing, inconsistent, and lacks specificity. In reading and re-
reading Ishu's deposition and Hanwright's testimony, we find that the 
parties throw around technical terms and phrases without ever explaining 
what many of them mean or how they fit into a Motorola phone. Further, it 
appears that many aspects of Motorola's process for creating a cellular 
phone involve publicly available equipment and standards. We cannot 
issue an injunction generically banning DBTEL from using any of 
Motorola's secrets if DBTEL does not know what those secrets are.217 
 
This is a classic example of a court being unable to discern patterns from the parties’ 
behavior.  Note that the difficulty is not that the court is unable to parse the industry’s 
jargon—rather the rub is that the court cannot determine how information traveled across 
firm boundaries because the firms themselves are unclear as to such.  Considering the 
fact that Motorola waited a year after DBTel’s alleged breach to file its petition,218 it is 
unlikely that the evidence was hard to analyze because it was presented poorly or hastily.  
Rather, the source of the court’s struggle is the fluid process of collaborative innovation, 
where information and initiative flows fluidly between parties.  Because the court was 
unable to interpret the evidence of such interaction, it denied the request for the 
injunction, perhaps refusing relief Motorola should have had.    
                                                 
216 Motorola v. DBTel [prelim injunction ruling] at 3 (“Most of the facts in this case are not in dispute; the 
major areas of disagreement concern the correct interpretation of those facts.”) 
217 Motorola v. DBTel [prelim injunction ruling] at 54-55 (italics added). 
218 Motorola v. DBTel [prelim injunction ruling] at 64. 
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Motorola is also noteworthy in that it illustrates courts’ difficulty with an issue 
antecedent to contextual interpretation: the admissibility of evidence.  Parties fight over 
the admissibility of evidence in order to limit the scope of the court’s search beyond the 
four-corners of the contract to identify the parties’ agreement.  Motorola filed a motion in 
limine to exclude documents that included reference to settlement negotiations under Fed. 
R. Evid. 408.  The issue was difficult because settlement negotiations over the dispute at 
hand occurred simultaneously while the parties negotiated a separate, but related, 
contract.219  The court’s solution to the problem is telling: where interpreting the evidence 
was especially delicate, the court turned the task over to the parties, asking them to agree 
on what evidence was admissible and what was not.220  Thus, the magistrate, 
acknowledging that information was observable but unverifiable, turned interpretation 
over to those most able to do it: the collaborators themselves.  This instinct will be 
corroborated when we consider self-enforcement in Part IV(B) below. 
General Motors Corp. v. Northrop Corp. also illustrates the perils of contextual 
interpretation.221  In 1986, the U.S. Air Force (“USAF”) selected Northrop and Lockheed 
to compete in the production of the USAF’s next generation “advanced tactical fighter.”  
The better of the two prototype jets would receive a 20-year contract worth $50 billion.222  
While Northrop and Lockheed were competing for the overall design and production of 
                                                 
219 Motorola v. DBTel [memorandum order] at 10-11 (“Because the parties continued parts of their 
business relationship even after their current dispute began, there is no bright line between settlement 
discussions and other, merits-related issues.”). 
220 Id. at 9-10 (“Defendant has offered to meet with plaintiff in an attempt to agree to redactions in the 
documents plaintiff identified as containing settlement discussions. We agree that the parties should 
undertake such a process in lieu of the Court making its own redactions.”) 
221 General Motors Corp. and Allison Engine Company, Inc. v. Northrop Corp, Northrop Aircraft Division, 
807 N.E.2d 70 (Ind. App. Ct. 2004).  All of the facts were found in the opinion.  Northrop at 76-87. 
222 Appellant’s Brief at 3 (2002 WL 32814003 (Ind.App.)).   
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the aircraft,223 General Electric (“GE”) and Pratt & Whitney (“P&W”) were chosen to 
compete for the engine design.224  Northrop contracted with Allison Engine (“Allison”), a 
subsidiary of General Motors, to design and manufacture a liner that would protect the 
jet’s body from the high-temperature exhaust.225 
Information gleaned from the parties’ briefs indicates that the parties incorporated 
pragmatic governance mechanisms into their contract.  The parties began by 
benchmarking design and production,226 set up an error detection and correction 
regime,227 and made simultaneous engineering possible through greater proximity.228   
Pragmatic governance was used because of the high level of uncertainty.  When 
the deal between the two parties was finalized, the specifications of the product to 
                                                 
223 An in flight picture of the Northrop prototype, designated the YF-23, can be found at 
http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/Gallery/photo/YF-23/Medium/EC94-42454-3.jpg (last visited 29 July 2006); a 
picture of the Lockheed YF-22, which eventually won the USAF’s contract, can be found at 
http://www.boeing.com/history/boeing/f22.html (last visited 29 July 2006) (note: Boeing later acquired 
Lockheed). 
224 Appellant’s Brief, supra note __, at 3.   
225 Id. 
226 Id. at 4-5, (“Northrop issued a Request for Proposal (“RFP”) for the Liner's design and development and 
a Statement of Work (“SOW”) setting forth design and manufacturing parameters…. Subsequently, 
Northrop gave Rohr and Allison a Product Function Specification  (“PFS”), which generally described the 
Liner's functional environment.”)(internal citations omitted). 
227 The agreement required problems to be identified and solutions to be openly communicated.  Id. 
(“Northrop's RFP (incorporating the SOW) instructed each bidder to: (i) propose a firm fixed price for 
designing and building the Liner; (ii) notify Northrop immediately of any errors, ambiguities, or 
inconsistencies in the RFP; and (iii) identify in writing any “reasons” for Allison's design choices [which] 
are not obvious or are subject to misinterpretation.”)(internal citations omitted); see also Northrop v GM 
[Apr 2004 judgment on appeal] fn 9 and 10 (describing sections of the contract that deal with correcting 
design errors).  Also, a committee was established to oversee joint design and production.  Appellant’s 
Brief at 7, (“The Agreement also contained several provisions requiring Allison to notify Northrop of any 
changes in the scope of work… including one addressing Northrop directed changes to ‘drawings, designs 
or specifications.’ To ensure compliance with the notification requirements, Allison established a formal 
reporting system. Allison's EEL Program Manager… assigned Allison's Contracts Manager… the task of 
submitting to Northrop the ‘subcontract change proposals.’”) (internal citations omitted) (names removed 
to protect privacy).  
228 Id. at 92 (indicating that the parties had personnel stationed at each other’s facilities).  Furthermore, 
Allison was required to simultaneously engineer not only with Northrop but also with General Electric and 
Pratt & Whitney, the engine manufacturers.  See e.g. id. at 8 (“A month into the contract on October 29, 
1987, Allison and Northrop personnel met with GE to discuss GE's prior Liner design effort.”). 
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be manufactured were uncertain.229  As time passed, the parties had difficulty 
refining these specifications because uncertainty was endogenous: e.g. they could 
not agree on what the engine environment, which the liner was supposed to 
control, was going to be like.230  Thus, Allison went forward experimentally;231 its 
actions governed through pragmatic mechanisms.     
Problems arose as Allison began to go over-budget.  Because Northrop had 
changed the aircraft’s design multiple times, Allison had to start over more than once.  
Compounding this cost was Northrop’s insistence that Allison stick to its production 
schedule: in order to meet the deadline Allison put its personnel on “war-time” status, 
requiring its workforce to work around-the-clock.232  When Northrop denied Allison’s 
claim accounting for these increased costs, Allison filed a complaint in Indiana state court 
with claims of breach of contract and of common law causes of action sounding in 
contract.233     
The primary interpretive issue in play was whether Allison had conformed to the 
notice provisions requiring written notice of design changes where Allison repeatedly 
provided only oral notification without protest from Northrop.  Throughout the 
adjudication of the dispute, the courts employed contextualist interpretation.  The trial 
court, implicitly supporting a contextualist approach, initially denied Northrop’s motion 
                                                 
229 Id. at 6-7, (“On September 3-4, 1987, Northrop and Allison negotiated the Master Agreement 
(‘Agreement’), reviewing, initialing and dating each contract document page-by-page.  Consistent 
with the SOW and Allison's proposal, the Agreement did not specify or contemplate any specific 
liner design.”)(internal citations omitted). 
230 Northrop v. GM, supra __, at 82 [Apr 2004 opinion] (“Northrop and Allison could not agree as to what 
the environment would be for the shoulders of the EEL.”). 
231 Id. (“Allison informed Northrop that it would proceed according to its understanding of the 
environment.”). 
232 Northrop v. GM [Apr 2004 decision] at 82. 
233 General Motors, Corp. v. Northrop Corp., 685 N.E.2d 127, 134-5 (1997). 
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for summary judgment.234  However, on a motion to reconsider, where Northrop brought 
more specific notice provisions to the court’s attention, the trial court reversed itself and 
granted Northrop’s motion for summary judgment.235  The appellate court, finding that 
the federal common law236 rule required that determinations of notice should not be 
“technical or illiberal” and that notice provisions are subject to estoppel, reversed the trial 
court and remanded for trial.237   After a 30-day trial, the jury found that Allison had 
provided notice.  The verdict was overwhelming: total damages, including interest, of 
over $50 million.238  Northrop appealed, of course, and the interpretation issue was still at 
the heart of the controversy.  Affirming the trial court’s decision, the appellate court 
referred to course of performance when determining both whether Allison provided 
adequate notice and whether Northrop’s behavior constituted a waiver of the contract’s 
notice requirement.239   
The case’s circuitous, ten-year journey through the Indiana court system 
illustrates contextualist interpretation’s difficulties in resolving interpretive issues.  Of 
course, parties in high-stakes litigation will appeal inclement decisions even if their 
chances of success are rather marginal.  However, it is telling that the same issue of 
factual interpretation was at the heart of every appeal.  [the trial court decisions, for 
which the author is still waiting, should shed some more light on this].  This suggests that 
                                                 
234 Id. at 135 (“The trial court denied Northrop’s motion noting that one of the changes provisions did not 
seem to apply to the change at hand and that the evidence showed that Northrop may well have been aware 
of the changes made and that was a question of fact inappropriate for a summary judgment 
determination.”). 
235 Id. at 135-6. 
236 The court held that federal common law governed disputes over particular purchase orders which 
included the notice of changes provision provided in Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.243-7; California 
law governed the other issues.  Id. at 134-5.  
237 Id. at 136-7. 
238 Northrop v. GM [Apr 2004 decision] [get pin cite]. 
239 Id. at 90-1. 
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the inability to definitively interpret and, thus, enforce contracts between collaborators is 
symptomatic of contextualist interpretation.   
Contextualism’s Harm 
Contract enforcement relying on the context of the agreement undermines 
innovative collaboration in that it discourages flexibility and experimentation.  “[P]arties 
who develop innovative [contracts] bear significant, exogenous, legal risks”240 because 
they do not know whether their unique forms of obligation will be recognized by a 
contextualist court.241  A simple example illustrates the problem:  Where parties are 
simultaneously engineering, creative leeway is necessary to accommodate what is a 
highly uncertain process.  At first glance, contextualist enforcement appears to support 
such leeway: it allows parties to alter the terms of their agreement as contingencies 
arise—without such adjustments, collaborations would implode.  This enforcement 
philosophy has a paradoxical effect, however: a party who knows its obligations will be 
interpreted contextually has a greater incentive to shirk because there is a reasonably 
probability that shirking will be construed as a valid modification of the contract.  Since 
this party’s collaborators, savvy to such behavior because they are sophisticated market 
participants, cannot afford such shirking, they will naturally circumscribe ex ante the 
scope of the potential deviant party’s activity.  In other words, they will rely more heavily 
upon control rights.  As was shown in Part III above, reliance on control rights dampens 
the creativity necessary for effective competition in the new economy.     
                                                 
240 Goetz and Scott, supra note ___, at 278. 
241 Id. at 320 (“Unfortunately, current [contextualist] rules of interpretation provide few effective 
mechanisms for distinguishing between apparent inconsistency and deliberate indeterminacy.  For 
relational contractors, therefore, interpretive disputes will essentially be a lottery until the state provides the 
requisite instruments for more accurate signaling.”). 
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On the other hand, the UCC’s flexibility provisions may also discourage efficient 
departures from the original agreement.  Bernstein has argued that such is possible for a 
range of departures that are temporally or contingently efficient—i.e. “[t]here are certain 
types of adjustments a transactor might be willing to make at many discrete points in an 
ongoing contractual relationship that she would nonetheless be unwilling to promise to 
make.”242  Because the UCC construes such flexibility to indicate adjustments to the 
contract, parties will be less likely to choose such beneficial adjustments. 243   There is 
reason to believe that Bernstein’s argument is especially compelling in an innovative 
situation.  This is because, in situations of endogenous uncertainty, parties cannot readily 
identify “bad” departures from “good” ones.  However, if parties do not object to non-
conformity at the time it occurs, the courts, following the Code’s course of performance 
doctrine, will interpret that as tacit acceptance of a modification.244  Thus, there is a 
strong incentive for parties to object whenever there is a possibility that their 
collaborator’s activity might amount to non-conforming behavior because they do not 
want to shut the door on later court enforcement.  This paradoxical “rigidity effect”245 
undercuts the convention-spurning creativity that is innovation’s sine qua non.  The more 
collaborators’ activities are circumscribed and generic, the less innovative these 
relationships become.  In short, contextualist interpretation is a costly anachronism. 
Contextualist enforcement’s inimical effect on collaborations is apparent in 
Lockheed v. galaxis USA, a dispute between two collaborators trying to design and 
                                                 
242 Bernstein [merchant law], supra note___, at 1808. 
243 For a refinement of Bernstein’s original argument see Ben-Shahar, Omri, “Formalism in Contract Law: 
The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law,” 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 781, 792-6 (1999). 
244 UCC § 2-208(1) says that course of performance is inferred only where it is “acquiesced in without 
objection.” 
245 “Rigidity effect” is Ben-Shahar’s term for Bernstein’s original insight.  Ben-Shahar, supra note __, at 
795. 
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manufacture a marketable satellite TV receiver for recreational watercraft.246  With an 
eye towards potential litigation, Lockheed, concluding that there was “considerable risk” 
because of a “lack of a sufficient drawing package” at the start of the project, went into 
the collaboration “not want[ing] a considerable design effort required on their part, to 
ensure that they present[ed] back to [galaxis] the right kind of product, so that [galaxis 
could not] fault the manufacturing effort.”247  Thus, a rigid formal division between 
design and manufacturing functions was included in the contract.  Such a division was 
unnatural, however, considering that Lockheed participated directly and extensively in 
the collaborative design process: first, Lockheed reversed engineered a competitor’s 
model to begin the design process;248 second, Lockheed initiated all of the design 
changes, simply asking for galaxis’ approval;249 third, Lockheed discussed software 
design issues outside the remit of the immediate contract with a German subsidiary 
involved in the collaboration;250 and, fourth, the galaxis representative in charge of 
authorizing all of the Lockheed’s proposed design changes was, in fact, a former 
Lockheed engineer that had been hired from the Lockheed team working on the 
project.251  To maintain the strict division between design and manufacturing 
responsibility, galaxis was forced to undermine the very dynamics that make 
collaboration productive: first, galaxis management frequently had to “stop all the 
changes unless they are officially approved and set out in drawings which are handed 
                                                 
246 Lockheed Martin Corporation v. galaxis USA, Ltd., 222 Fed. Supp. 2d 1315, 1320-1 (M.D.Fl. 2002) 
[magistrate’s recommendation and decision on summary judgment]. 
247 Lockheed v. galaxis USA, supra note __, [memorandum opinion and order] at 40 (quoting defendant’s 
testimony). 
248 Id. 
249 See id. at 41 (discussing how galaxis reviewed and accepted Lockheed’s suggested design alterations). 
250 Id. at 42. 
251 Id. at 37, 42. 
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over to Lockheed;”252 and, second, galaxis management frequently admonished its 
employees to cease unofficial “cross-talk” between themselves and Lockheed and to 
rather direct their feedback through the centralized approval process.253  In other words, 
galaxis had to short-circuit both pragmatic governance’s error detection/correction and 
simultaneous engineering mechanisms.  Thus, the collaboration was hobbled from the 
start due to the parties’ attempts to circumvent inappropriate contract enforcement.  
These attempts were in vain, however, as a dispute arose when galaxis attempted to 
amend the contract ex post to make Lockheed responsible for design changes.254   
 
B. Parties’ Attempts to Cope: Self-enforcement and ADR 
 Arguably in response to contextualism’s limitations, parties have begun 
fashioning alternatives.   
 Broad Trends 
A content analysis of 8705 collaboration agreements, when compared to 
Eisenberg and Miller’s recent survey of general commercial use of arbitration clauses,255 
indicates that collaborators rely more heavily upon arbitration than their non-
collaborative counterparts.  Further analysis shows that the same holds true for use of 
mediation.  Contextualism’s inability to effectively govern collaborations helps explain 
these parties’ preference for enforcement through ADR processes.256   
                                                 
252 Id. at 43.   
253 Id. at [get the pin cite]. 
254 Id. at 52 (discussing galaxis trying to force Lockheed to accept design responsibility). 
255 Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller, “The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante 
Arbitration Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts,” available on SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=927423. 
256 This echoes Richman’s argument that parties will rely on private ordering when court enforcement 
becomes unreliable.  Richman, Barak, “Firms, Courts, and Reputational Mechanisms: Towards a Positive 
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 The content analysis involved coding material contracts filed with the SEC as 
exhibits to Form 8-K.  From 1993 through 2005, 8705 of the contracts filed were 
collaboration agreements.  These contracts were searched for arbitration (both binding 











12/31/2005 1452 627 247 184
  100% 43.18% 17.00% 12.67%
1/1/2004-
12/31/2004 1189 668 230 134
  100% 56.18% 19.34% 11.27%
1/1/2003-
12/31/2003 813 385 117 81
  100% 47.36% 14.39% 9.96%
1/1/2002-
12/31/2002 619 298 97 64
  100% 48.14% 15.67% 10.34%
1/1/2001-
12/31/2001 476 229 88 59
  100% 48.11% 18.49% 12.39%
1/1/2000-
12/31/2000 1348 694 272 204
  100% 51.48% 20.17% 15.13%
1/1/1999-
12/31/1999 708 326 133 66
  100% 46.05% 18.79% 9.32%
1/1/1998-
12/31/1998 746 406 160 84
  100% 54.42% 21.44% 11.26%
1/1/1997-
12/31/1997 737 411 172 96
  100% 55.77% 23.34% 13.03%
1/1/1996-
12/31/1996 506 230 91 26
  100% 45.45% 17.98% 5.14%
1/1/1995-
12/31/1995 79 37 11 3
  100% 46.84% 13.92% 3.80%
1/1/1994-
12/31/1994 26 12 0 0
  100% 46.15% 0.00% 0.00%
1/1/1993- 6 6 1 3
                                                                                                                                                 
Theory of Private Ordering” 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2328, 2330 (2004)(“private law is not merely a convenient 
or necessary replacement for public courts but rather arises systematically and predictably.”). 
257 This initial analysis used a rather simple coding scheme; the results should be considered preliminary 
until more robust analysis is undertaken. 
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12/31/1993 
  100% 100% 16.66% 50.00%
1/1/1992-
12/31/1992 0 0 0 0
  0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1/1/1991-
12/31/1991 0 0 0 0

















 Reliance on ADR is significantly higher in these contracts than those analyzed by 
Eisenberg and Miller.  49.36% of the collaboration agreements filed from 1995 through 
2005 had arbitration clauses,258 compared to Eisenberg and Miller’s overall average of 
10.64% of contracts including arbitration clauses.259  In 2004, the arbitration clause 
average for collaboration agreements was as high as 56.18%.  In any event, these results 
are appreciably higher than the contract type with the most incidences of arbitration 
                                                 
258 This average omits the early years with extremely small sample sizes. 
259 Eisenberg and Miller, supra note __, at 22. 
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clauses in Eisenberg and Miller’s study: employment contracts with about 37%.260  Also, 
this trend repeats with mediation clauses.  Since Eisenberg and Miller do not analyze 
mediation, it was necessary to construct a mediation clause baseline.  A sample, totaling 
19,317 agreements, of all material contracts filed as exhibits to Form 8-K from 1 January 
2002 through 31 March 2002 was taken.  Of this broad sample, 449 contracts, or 2.32%, 
included mediation clauses.  Again, collaboration agreements included mediation clauses 
more frequently, with 10.39% being the average from 1995-2005.  In 2001, 15.13% of 
collaboration agreements included mediation clauses.  Although further analysis is 
necessary to tease out answers to many remaining questions, it is apparent that something 
different is happening with collaborations.  While many commercial actors are fleeing 
ADR, collaborators are embracing it. 
 The Trends in Perspective 
Taking a closer look at contracts between collaborators illustrates why parties are 
turning to ADR for contract enforcement.  The dispute resolution clauses analyzed above 
are often integrated into an overarching escalation procedure. First, disputes are referred 
to an oversight committee:   
5.3 Dispute Resolution/Escalation.  In the event that a dispute arises between Cisco and 
KPMG pertaining to any matters which are the subject matter of the Alliance (a 
“Dispute”), and either Party so requests in writing, prior to the initiation of any formal 
legal action, the following dispute resolution process shall apply: 
*** 
5.3.2 Technical Issues - Responsible Executives. If the Dispute involves a technical issue 
or any other non-sales related issue, the matter may, at the option of either Party, be 
submitted for discussion and resolution to the Responsible Executives of KPMG and 
Cisco ("Responsible Executives"), as identified in Exhibit C. The Responsible Executives 
shall be responsible for including any other relevant senior managers from their Party, 
such as any affected business unit general managers. The Responsible Executives shall 
use their good faith efforts to resolve the Dispute within ten (10) days. If the Responsible 
Executives are unable to resolve the Dispute in such period, the matter shall be referred to 
the Executive Sponsors for resolution. 261 
                                                 
260 Id. at 21. 
261 See e.g. the Cisco-KPMG contract, supra note __, §5.3.  
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Second, if the oversight committee is unable to broker an acceptable resolution, more 
senior executives from the collaborating firms are brought into the process: 
5.3.3 Executive Sponsors. For all Disputes referred to the Executive Sponsors, the 
Executive Sponsors shall use their good faith efforts to resolve the Dispute within twenty 
(20) days after such referral. If the Executive Sponsors are unable to resolve the Dispute 
in such period, the Dispute shall be referred to the respective Chief Executive Officers of 
Cisco and KPMG for resolution. 
 
5.3.4 Chief Executive Officers. For all Disputes referred to the Chief Executive Officers 
from the Executive Sponsors, the Chief Executive Officers shall use their good faith 
efforts to resolve the Dispute within twenty (20) days after such referral.262 
 
 Third, if a mutually agreeable solution has not been found after the inclusion of the 
executives in the process, recourse to ADR is then sought: 
5.3.5 Mediation and Legal Action. In the event that the Chief Executive Officers are 
unable to resolve the Dispute within the period allowed, then either Party shall have the 
right to submit the Dispute to mediation in accordance with the terms of Section 10.1, 
unless the Chief Executive Officer of a Party notifies the other Party's Chief Executive 
Officer in writing that mediation is not desired and would not be effective. In the event 
that the parties are unable to resolve the Dispute under such mediation (or either Party 
receives the notice declining mediation as set forth in this Section 5.3.5), then either Party 
shall have the right to pursue any remedies available to it relating to the Dispute under the 
terms of this Alliance Agreement or otherwise available to it under law or equity.”)263 
 
  The process is designed to create as many opportunities for crafting a collaborative 
solution as possible.264   
This dispute resolution mechanism appears in the contracts examined in Part III 
above.  For instance, the Allstate contract established the following resolution procedure: 
first, both parties’ contract managers were to resolve the dispute;265 second, if the 
contract managers could not reach a consensus, an escalation procedure, which brought in 
                                                 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 For a general discussion of ADR, which places mediation in a preliminary place to arbitration and/or 
litigation, see Kimball, supra note ___, at 490-491.  For a general discussion of arbitration’s role in IT 
outsourcing dispute resolution, see Gross, Bradley J., International Arbitration as a Method for Dispute 
Resolution in International Outsourcing Agreements in OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2004 873-885 (2004).   
265 Id. at §21.2 (“The parties will initially attempt to resolve disputes arising in the ordinary course of the 
parties performance under this Agreement, at the Contract Manager level by those directly involved.”). 
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senior management into the process, was to handle the problem;266 and third, if the 
escalation procedure was not producing a swift result and either party believed that 
swifter closure was necessary, then the parties were allowed to pursue remedies in either 
law or equity.267  The Coke contract required, first, the parties to involve increasingly 
senior levels of management in dispute resolution negotiations; second, if self-
enforcement failed, for adjudication to be limited to binding arbitration; and, third, those 
arbitrators the full range of remedies available at law and equity.268  The Apple contract’s 
dispute resolution mechanism was a bit thinner than the two aforementioned; however, 
the general contours are still there: first, each side was required to designate operations 
managers who provided the first step in the dispute resolution process;269 second, 
although the parties did not explicitly outline any additional escalation process, they 
acknowledged the validity of alternative forms of dispute resolution.270   
As these contracts show, the dispute resolution mechanisms constructed in 
pragmatic governance contracts are premised upon the idea of peer review, especially in 
the early stages of escalation.  Hierarchical “judging” is replaced with problem-solving 
between equals.  This is exemplified in the non-adversarial approach many counsel take 
to resolving collaboration disputes.271  The logic of “appeal” in this system is not to 
remedy an arguably erroneous “judgment;” rather, the matter is “appealed” simply on the 
                                                 
266 Id. at §21.3.  An expedited process for “critical problems” where immediate resolution was necessary 
was also established.  Id. at §21.4. 
267 Id. at §21.5. (“If either Party believes in good faith that the time frames described in this Section 21 will 
have a material adverse impact on such party, then this Section 21 shall be deemed to apply no longer to 
such dispute and the Parties may take any legal action in a court of law or equity to assert or enforce a 
claim it has against the other Party under this Agreement.”). 
268 Coke-Senomyx contract, supra note __, at §17.4. 
269 Id. at §7.9, see discussion supra note ___. 
270 Id. at §22.12 (“Any litigation or other dispute resolution between the parties relating to this Agreement 
will take place in the Northern District of California.”) (italics added). 
271 Glasspiegel, supra note ___, at 418. 
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grounds that consensus has not been reached.  The entire idea behind the system, often 
referred to as “marriage counseling” by practitioners,272 is to keep the collaboration alive, 
not to vindicate personal rights.  This is no better seen than in these contracts’ unwinding 
provisions, which require a grace period where the parties maintain the collaboration 
even after it has soured.273  In short, the dispute resolution mechanisms here mirror 
pragmatic governance, especially its error detection/correction aspects.   
 
V. Prescriptions about the law that should govern this behavior 
Are the shortcomings of contextualist contract enforcement a cause of public 
concern if parties can self-enforce?  Why not leave collaborators alone to sort out these 
private disputes? 
Indeed, to an extent, pragmatic governance mechanisms have effectively 
compensated for contextualism’s deficiencies.  As the external adjudicator is no longer 
able to accurately interpret context; context is now internalized within the contract itself.  
Pragmatic governance mechanisms internalize context through the referential rule-
making mechanism that is benchmarking and error detection/correction: parties refer to 
their own ongoing experimentation to set performance milestones, they then adjust these 
“rules” in real-time fashion in light of their on-going experience.  In a way, these two 
mechanisms correspond to traditional contextualist doctrines: benchmarking is similar to 
trade usage and course of dealing; error detection and correction similar to course of 
performance.  For disputes, parties have institutionalized self-enforcement and have 
                                                 
272 Kimball, George, Governance and Dispute Resolution: Making it Work in Outsourcing Revolution 2005 
491 (2005). 
273 Flesh out using the Halvey material (see chapter 15). 
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ensured flexible third-party enforcement through prevalent use of ADR.  Private ordering 
is accomplishing what the Code never could. 
However, despite its accomplishments, pragmatic governance still requires 
support from external institutions.  As Motorola, Northrop, and Lockheed have shown, 
innovative collaborations are still susceptible to instability.  The economic pressures that 
have led firms to compete along product innovation do not stop once the strategic alliance 
agreement has been signed.  Rather, the dwindling margins characteristic of the current 
global economy create a powerful centripetal force on any collaborative production 
arrangement.274  Of course, well-drafted pragmatic governance mechanisms contain 
elaborate exit terms in order to anticipate a failed joint endeavor.275  Governance failures, 
however, create considerable externalities: a collaboration’s unraveling can impact 
communities as workers are laid off, plants move, etc.  Such a collapse also ripples 
through the local networks that often arise around collaborative producers and that 
facilitate intra-industry learning.276  Thus, there are compelling public policy arguments 
for institutional support for pragmatic governance.   
Whatever its virtues, pragmatic governance is not automatically a self-sustaining 
virtuous cycle.277  Whitford’s cataloging of collaborative dysfunction has led him to 
                                                 
274 See e.g. Whitford, supra note __, at 95 (“In spite of very real effort by OEMs to reformulate 
organizational structures and to build collaborative relationships with suppliers, these relationships are 
nevertheless frequently characterized by ‘bad waltzing’ that differs fundamentally from the simple use of 
hard bargaining tactics backed up with the threat of exit power.  Simple hard bargaining is widely 
understood by suppliers to be well within the norms of everyday business and predictable enough that it 
need not undermine collaboration.  But interviews with OEMs and suppliers… show that relationships are 
also systematically plagued by ambiguous signaling and rife with no-hold-barred tactics used by OEMs 
exploiting vulnerabilities opened up by the new relationships for short term gain.”). 
275 See e.g. Hirshman, Neil S., “Control Provisions” in THE OUTSOURCING REVOLUTION 2003: PROTECTING 
CRITICAL BUSINESS FUNCTIONS, Delaney, John F. and William A. Tanenbaum, eds. 345 (2003). 
276 See e.g. Porter, Michael, “Clusters and the new economics of competition,” Harvard Business Review 
(Nov. 1998). 
277 Whitford, supra note __, at 100-16. 
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argue for public intervention in the new economy.278  While reform at the policy level is 
perhaps necessary,279 proper contract enforcement is a crucial, arguably more 
fundamental, ingredient in stabilizing inter-firm collaboration.  Appropriate contract 
enforcement can play a prophylactic role—parties will be more willing to draft pragmatic 
governance mechanisms knowing there is a responsive enforcement system—and a 
corrective role—sensitive enforcement can resolve disputes and, thus, repair broken 
relationships.   
 
A.  The Outstanding Prescriptions 
 Before outlining this paper’s vision of what courts’ role should be in supporting 
innovative collaborations, it is necessary to address the dominant contextualist critiques: 
the default-rules project and neoformalism.280  Default rules are a non-starter in regards to 
enforcing pragmatic governance mechanisms.  Neoformalism holds promise; however, 
because it only addresses half of the problem, neoformalism is no more than a fragment 
of a solution. 
1.  The Default Rule Project 
Some have argued for replacing contextualist enforcement with a system of 
default rules.  The argument is that, rather than trying to fill contractual gaps by 
                                                 
278 Id. at 129-53. 
279 For recommendations, see Svetiev, Yane, “Antitrust Governance” and Whitford, Josh and Jonathan 
Zeitlin, “Governing Decentralized Production: Institutions, Public Policy, and the Prospects for Inter-Firm 
Cooperation in the United States,” 11 Industry and Innovation (2004). 
280 It may be tempting to argue that a rule of efficient breach would effectively govern innovative 
collaboration.  The theory of efficient breach holds that “breach of contract is efficient and therefore 
desirable if the promisor’s gain from breach (after payment of expectation damages) will exceed the 
promisee’s loss from breach.”  Eisenberg, Melvin, “The Theory of Efficient Breach and the Theory of 
Efficient Termination,” University of California-Berkeley Law & Economics Workshop working paper 
#14,  8-9 (2004).  In other words, rather than overhauling the contextualist regime, courts should simply 
allow parties to split when it is efficient to do so.  The problem with this argument, however, is that 
determining whether one party’s gain will exceed the loss of the other is as error-prone as a court trying to 
fill contract gaps by referencing innovators’ course of performance or industry norms.   
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interpreting parties’ subjective intent, the courts should supply objective gap-fillers.281  
By “objective” gap-fillers, it is meant that the court should consider “the risks that parties 
similarly situated would plausibly have agreed to bear at the time the contract was 
made.”282  This is normatively attractive because a general rule that captures low 
transaction costs for most parties approximates what any two parties would have chosen 
had they been able to bargain.283  Supplying default rules is essentially the same thing as 
contextualism except that the gaps in the contract are filled ex ante (through predictable 
defaults) rather than ex post (through course of performance, trade usage, etc.).284  Clear 
and predictable defaults, it is hypothesized, reduce transaction costs for parties because, 
first, the parties can rely on the defaults and forego costly negotiations over a term and, 
second, the defaults reduce uncertainty for the bargainers. 
This approach suffers from a number of deficiencies.  First, there is an inherent 
paradox within the argument: in order for courts to discover default rules, they must look 
beyond the agreement and interpret a contract’s context; this, however, undermines the ex 
ante predictability which is the default rules paradigm’s goal.285  Thus, while default rules 
                                                 
281 Scott, supra note __, [case for formalism] at 849. 
282 Id. 
283 Id at 850 (“[I]n a world of transactions costs anything can happen, and, absent substantial data on  these 
costs, one cannot predict that any given rule is better than any other for any particular set of contracting 
parties.  Surely, though, some rule for allocating common contracting risks is preferable to no rule.  If so, 
the law ought to adopt the rule that the broadest number of parties would adopt were transactions costs low 
enough for negotiators to tailor-make their own rules…. Where transactions costs are too high for parties to 
fashion their own rule, it is nonetheless normatively correct to provide them with the rule that they 
probably would have chosen for themselves at the time of contracting had they been able to bargain.”). 
284 Id. at 860 (“Both of these two familiar strategies – seeking ex ante efficiency or ex post efficiency – 
presuppose a role for courts in filling gaps in incomplete contracts.”). 
285 Id. at 854-5 (“To the extent that the efficiency norm purports to embrace both predictable interpretations 
of incomplete contracts as well as the standardization of contract terms, it is subject to a fundamental 
dilemma: the process of incorporating useful defaults undercuts the process of standardization….  On the 
one hand, official “recognition” of these default understandings may assist future parties in better designing 
their contractual relationship.  But, on the other hand, the act of incorporating these defaults as an aid to 
interpretation of the litigated contract will also have the effect of conditioning the explicit price and 
quantity terms in the contract, terms that otherwise appeared fixed and determinate on their face.”). 
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may reduce the transaction costs associated with contracting, they also destabilize the 
interpretation process (since a focus on identifying and applying default rules will 
“necessarily threaten the integrity of the express terms in disputed contract because the 
interpreter will be reluctant to give the explicit terms meanings that conflict with the 
apparent factual and legal context.”).286  Second, the problem with this approach when 
applied to new economy industries is that it is nigh impossible to determine generally 
efficient rules in heterogeneous, innovative, volatile markets.287  The rules would be so 
general as to approach meaninglessness.  Furthermore, it is doubtful, because of 
information asymmetries, whether a judge can identify some default rules in the first 
place—i.e. the state does not have access to all of the information necessary to determine 
a default rule.288  And third, default rules congeal slowly as the common law process 
transforms disparate phenomena into conventional wisdom.289  In a quick-moving 
economy, this gap between market expediency and judicial oversight can yawn to 
alarming extent.  In short, filling contractual gaps with context is insufficient, whether it’s 
performed ex ante or ex post. 
2.  Neoformalism 
The neoformalist argument—“neo” in that it evokes the 19th Century’s classical 
formalism—is elegant: the courts should “decline to fill gaps at all.”290  I.e. “courts would 
                                                 
286 Id. at 857. 
287 See also Id. at 863 (“the more heterogeneous the contracting parties are, the less the economies of scale 
for any default and the greater the likelihood that the state is less capable than the parties themselves in 
solving their contracting problems.”). 
288 Id. (“The state is incapable of completing contracts with useful default terms whenever contracts are 
incomplete owing to the problems of coping with hidden information.”). 
289 Goetz and Scott, supra note __, at 876 (“Because they evolve slowly, official rules necessarily lag 
behind the emergence of new conditions, resulting in increasingly ill-fitting formulations.”). 
290 Scott [case for formalism], supra note __, at 860. 
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enforce verifiable terms as written and decline the invitation to complete the contract.”291  
This approach’s primary virtue is predictability: when drafting their contract, parties will 
know how the courts will respond since court interpretation is unambiguous.292   
The neoformalist project suffers from an obvious deficiency: formalist 
interpretation “will increase the number of disputed contracts in which enforcement is 
denied because the contract is found to be fatally incomplete and/or ambiguous.”293  
Considering that the flexible terms of pragmatic governance mechanisms are ambiguous 
by nature, this deficiency creates a considerable risk that pragmatic governance 
mechanisms would go unenforced.  This would create an incentive for parties to abandon 
flexible rules in favor of hard-and-fast contract terms whenever possible and/or for 
parties to engage in self-help where verifiable terms are impractical.  In the former case, 
pragmatic governance mechanisms disappear; in the latter, they become severely 
unstable.  Neoformalists might be tempted to counterargue that relational constraints will 
compensate for underenforcement; however, as discussed in Part III, once cannot rely 
heavily upon reputation and trust in new, volatile, global markets.  In short, even if 
traditional contextualism’s methods are obsolete, Llewellyn’s original intuition is still 
true: context matters. 
There is a more nuanced problem with formalist enforcement, however.  
Neoformalism assumes that contract terms’ function is to serve as signals for partitioning 
risk between the parties294—i.e. terms are the agreed-upon signals indicating to the court 
                                                 
291 Id. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. at 860. 
294 See e.g. Id. at 866 (“Both the heterogeneity of contracting behavior and heterogeneity of contracting 
parties argue for a single-minded insistence on preserving the quality of the signals used by contracting 
parties to allocate risk.”) 
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which party assumed which risks.  This assumption is sound, of course, where parties are 
able to calculate uncertainties and know their preferences under possible contingencies.  
However, where parties are innovating, this assumption breaks down.  As discussed in 
Part III above, where uncertainty is endogenous—as is the case where parties are 
innovating—the very definition of one’s preferences are problematic.  If preferences are, 
at worst, undefined or, at best, rough estimates, then it does not make much sense to think 
of contract terms as signals for risk allocation.  Parties cannot allocate risk when they do 
not know their risk tolerances.   
Formalism’s limited ability to police collaborative production is suggested in a 
recent study by Robert Scott on the application of the common law indefiniteness 
doctrine.  The indefiniteness doctrine holds that contract terms that are too vague will not 
be enforced by the law.295  Due to their flexible nature, we might expect pragmatic 
governance mechanisms to fall into this category.  Of Scott’s sample of cases where 
indefiniteness was a major issue, 34 decisions enforced (i.e. contextually interpreted 
vague terms) and 55 denied enforcement.296  Scott argued that, regardless of whether the 
court was located in a state that followed the UCC or not, courts made their determination 
upon whether to enforce the indefinite contract by analyzing whether parties fully 
exploited the information available when drafting.297  In other words, where parties 
deliberately left the contract vague, the courts typically chose not to enforce the 
agreement.298  If, however, the contract “is incomplete owing to uncertain future states 
                                                 
295 Scott, Robert, “A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements,” 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1641, 1647 
(2003)(“ One of the core principles of the common law of contracts is that the promises of parties to a 
legally enforceable contract must be certain and definite such that their intention may be ascertained with a 
reasonable degree of certainty”). 
296 Id. at 1652-3. 
297 Id. at 1653.   
298 Id. at 1655. 
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that are not observable or not verifiable,” then the courts would, ceteris paribus, enforce 
the agreement.299  This latter situation is the case in pragmatic governance contracts: 
parties create indefinite terms because of radical and endemic uncertainty.  Thus, 
inasmuch as Scott’s study shows that courts instinctively recognize the limits of formalist 
enforcement in complex contracting, we find support for our doubts towards 
neoformalism. 
Despite its deficiencies, however, formalist interpretation has a role to play in 
enforcing pragmatic governance.  Not only does it solve half of the problem by enforcing 
unambiguous terms (which are found side-by-side to flexible terms in pragmatic 
governance mechanisms),300 neoformalism also provides a necessary condition for the 
problem-solving adjudication required to complete the enforcement equation.  Before we 
can see how this is so, however, we must first explicate the recently-theorized “problem-
solving court.”   
 
B. Enforcing Pragmatic Governance: Reinterpreting Alternative Dispute Resolution  
Llewellyn was right: the law should reference commercial reality when 
determining how to enforce an agreement.  Context matters—because contracts are 
incomplete—especially in the highly contingent new economy.  As we have seen, 
though, traditional contextualism can no longer rise to the occasion, while formalism 
refuses to pick up the gauntlet altogether.  Whither enforcement? 
1. Problem-Solving Courts 
 Theorizing Reform 
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300 See discussion in Part III above. 
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The institution to support pragmatic governance is pragmatic itself: the problem-
solving court.  Arising in areas where social problems have appeared particularly 
intractable (e.g. drug addiction,301 environmental protection,302 human rights,303 public 
school reform,304 etc.), these courts are broadly described as “courts of first impression 
that take their objective to be solving the social problems that underlie the tip of the 
various icebergs that appear for adjudication.”305  “Always a work in progress,”306 the 
problem-solving court is theorized to roughly follow the Toyoda production paradigm 
outlined above: first, they set achievement milestones for the client; second, they actively 
participate in the client’s treatment; and third, they closely monitor the client’s progress 
and troubleshoot emerging problems.307  In other words, they benchmark, simultaneously 
engineer, and error detect and correct.  Thus, these courts do not only vindicate rights—
they also collaboratively craft solutions. 
 While the application of problem-solving adjudication to conflicts over public 
rights has been a topic of controversy, it readily fits contract enforcement: the logic of 
problem-solving courts and “experimentalism” came from economic organization in the 
first place.  In the context of a dispute between collaborators, the logic of problem-
solving adjudication mirrors the internal dispute resolution mechanisms parties build into 
                                                 
301 Dorf, Michael and Charles Sabel, “Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government,” 
53 Vand. L. Rev. 831 (2000). 
302 See e.g. Karkkainen, Bradley, “Environmental Lawyering the Age of Collaboration,” 2002 Wisc. L. 
Rev. 555 (2002). 
303 See e.g. Lozner, Stacy Laira, “Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco CEDAW 
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Desegregation Civil Rights Agenda,” 81 N. Carolina L. Rev. (2003); Liebman, James and Charles Sabel, 
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their contracts.  I.e. where collaborators are in a dispute as to whether a particular flexible 
rule in their agreement is being fulfilled, the court will intervene, not to determine a 
winner, but to organize a solution with the parties.  To do so, the court in conjunction 
with the parties would set benchmarks for the collaborators to achieve in regards to 
progressing their dispute.  These benchmarks would not only be processual (e.g. resolve 
the dispute by a certain date) but also substantive (e.g. achieve a particular level of 
performance).  Throughout the process, the court would actively monitor the parties’ 
progress through situation-specific metrics and assist the parties in troubleshooting errors.  
Such monitoring, an impossibility where information is asymmetric, would be feasible 
through the use of penalty defaults: default rules that the courts can employ to penalize 
parties when they refuse to share relevant information with the court.308  A penalty 
default would not necessarily require an affirmative penalty, such as a fine; rather, the 
court could simply hold out the following: if the parties do not provide the information 
necessary to solve this dispute collaboratively, the court will enforce the contract 
formalistically.  In other words, the penalty default is that the court will refuse to enforce 
the pragmatic governance provisions of the contract.  Such would create an incentive for 
parties to cooperate with the experimentalist enforcement (while also giving them the 
freedom to exit the contract if they wish).  Thus, we see neoformalism’s role: it is the 
penalty default making experimentalist enforcement’s monitoring function possible. 
 Available Resources for Reform 
                                                 
308 Ayres, Ian and Gertnert, Robert, “Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default 
Rules” 99 Yale L. J. 87 (1989).  Dorf defines a penalty default in general terms as “a state of affairs so 
unpalatable to all parties that they have no choice but to hammer out some solution that is, from the 
perspective of the default, a Pareto improvement.” Dorf [legal indeterminacy], supra note __, at 946.   
 79
 Many of problem-solving adjudication’s characteristics are already found in 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) methodologies.  The flexibility often touted as one 
of ADR’s advantages309 mirrors the wide scope of possible solutions available to the 
problem-solving court.  In this similarity, this paper finds support for its normative 
argument; however, simply directing collaborators to use ADR processes more frequently 
is insufficient.     
While the use of ADR is only to be encouraged, courts’ traditional view of ADR 
is misguided in the context of innovative collaborations.310  The most common reason 
that courts suggest or require parties to use ADR is to protect judicial economy.311  This 
logic has a perverse effect on resolving disputes between collaborators.  Since efficiency 
is the goal, ADR is frequently required for routine suits of relatively low complexity: e.g. 
most states have rules requiring ADR for tort and contract claims under a particular 
threshold.312  Following this logic, courts will rarely send collaborators to ADR: a dispute 
                                                 
309 Otis, Louise and Eric Reiter, “Mediation by Judges: A New Phenomenon in the Transformation of 
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procedural rules for the judicial mediation of high tech disputes.  Order Adding Rules 79.1, 91, 92, 93, 94 
and 95 of the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware (2003) [get full citation].  See also Gresser, 
Julian, “Turning Conflict into Opportunity through Alliance Mediation,” in STRUCTURING, NEGOTIATING & 
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suited to the special needs of business parties involved in these [collaborative] transactions.”); Kimball, 
supra note __, at 490-2 (advocating the use of “marriage counseling” to repair broken collaborations). 
311 See e.g. Edwards, Harry T., “Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?” 99 Harv. L. Rev 
668, 669-70 (1986)(“If alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are most significant as substitutes for 
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to rehash the issues or to resolve the ongoing debate as to whether we are truly an overly litigious society.  
It is enough to note that, in recent years, the cost of litigation has substantially increased and the number of 
cases filed in state and federal courts has mushroomed. For example, between 1960 and 1980 the number of 
filings per capita in federal district courts nearly doubled.  Although our judicial systems recently have 
been adjusted to meet  this massive increase in caseload, it is somewhat pollyanish to view the addition of 
still more judges as an acceptable solution to our society's ever increasing demand for judicial resources.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
312 Id. at 673-4 (“Many jurisdictions have compulsory arbitration for particular classes of cases -- primarily 
tort and contract disputes with potential damage awards below an established dollar ceiling. Critically, 
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between collaborators has complexity too great and stakes too sizeable to be delegated by 
a court.  Thus, when the innovation process breaks down, the collaborators are inevitably 
trapped in traditional (contextualist) adjudication—precisely where they do not want to 
be. 
 Injecting this system with a different logic, however, would bring providential 
results.  Rather than sending the simple cases away to ADR, the courts should follow a 
default rule that involves complex cases in ADR.  Such a default requirement would 
supply the disputants with external adjudication tailored to their internal dispute 
resolution mechanisms while also maintaining the integrity of those mechanisms (i.e. 
parties, still able to contract around the general default, would not have an incentive to 
undermine the system).  Furthermore, ADR would then have the muscle to dis-entrench 
parties’ crystallized bargaining equilibria since these efforts are backed by a serious 
penalty default: formalistic enforcement.   
Problem-solving contract enforcement is readily available through the federal  
magistrate judges, who are already regularly involved in these cases.  As we saw in 
Motorola and Lockheed, magistrate judges are frequently involved in disputes’ early 
stages, typically in regards to case management, evidentiary issues, and requests for 
injunctive relief.  Thus, the magistrate judges are well placed to conduct the problem-
solving dispute resolution that would be required by the default rule discussed above.313  
For instance, rather than, say, simply deciding on the injunction and then sheparding the 
case through discovery towards a trial years away, the magistrate judge would take an 
                                                                                                                                                 
therefore, court-annexed arbitration is most often used to resolve private disputes rather than difficult 
public law issues.”). 
313 Indeed, judicial mediation has become the norm, often mandatory, in Canada.  See Otis and Reiter, 
supra note __. 
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active and immediate role in resolving the substantive issues in the parties’ dispute.  
Indeed, magistrate judges are already playing a similar role in that they are regularly 
tasked with overseeing settlement negotiations.314  In short, the logic of pragmatic 
governance collaborators use to govern product innovation should be used to govern their 
disputes.  
A Job for the State? 
Without proactive intervention, this method of collaborative dispute resolution 
will simply be abdicated to the private sector.  Continuing to shift the burden of 
adjudication onto the private sector is poor policy.  First, since disputes between 
collaborators usually encompass myriad claims arising from antitrust, intellectual 
property, and common law fraud laws in addition to contract claims, the state will 
inevitably be involved in the dispute.  As it will be adjudicating these claims, the court is 
in a position to oversee the entire resolution of the dispute.  This oversight will not only 
rationalize the process but also provide the court additional information.  Second, courts 
have what has been termed “convening power,” which is “a polite way of saying that 
judicial decrees are backed by the threat of force.”315  This means they have the ability, 
unparalleled by a private mediator, to compel all parties necessary to come together to 
work out a resolution.  And third, courts have a “disentrenching capacity”—i.e. “the 
ability to declare some course of conduct unlawful, even where a court does not have a 
solution ready at hand, which enables courts to force other actors to address their 
                                                 
314 Lantka, Peter, “The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Magistrate Judge’s office: A 
Glimmering Light Amidst the Haze of Federal Legislation,” 36 UWLA L. Rev. 71, 88-92 (2005); see also 
Smith, Christopher E., UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS: SUBORDINATE JUDGES 
61-5 (1990). 
315 Dorf [Legal Indeterminacy], supra note __, at 945. 
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problems immediately.”316  This is the power that makes the penalty default possible.  If 
private mediators attempted penalty defaults, the parties would simply go elsewhere (an 
easy option considering there is an open market for mediators).  Courts, however, are 
forums of last resort, a status that gives them leverage vis-à-vis disputants.  This, then, is 
a job not only for the private sector but also for the state.   
2. Institutional Eclecticism: Theorizing New Governance 
The governance system emerging from the prescriptions above is an eclectic mix 
of adjudicatory philosophies.  Llewellyn’s contextualism, repackaged internally and 
enforced through experimentalist mechanisms, sits side-by-side with formalism.  While 
this is simply a reflection of reality—note the practitioner’s counsel that different 
problems require different resolution mechanisms317—it is nonetheless discomfiting, 
especially for the orthodox.  This issue of theoretical messiness has been addressed 
before, if indirectly and in another contest, by the Legal Process school.  Hart and Sachs 
theorized legal indeterminacy to be harnessed through “institutional settlements” which 
partitioned decisions on particular issues to those branches of government most 
competent.318  This is echoed in Scott’s characterization of formalist contract 
enforcement as “anti-imperialistic”319—i.e. courts have their place, but only in a larger 
constellation of enforcement institutions.  In the model advocated for in this paper, the 
settlement is not between institutions but, rather, between theories.  Thus, the most 
                                                 
316 Id. at 946. 
317 See Dorf [Legal Indeterminacy], supra note __, at 960 (“no complete legal system can be thoroughly 
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 83
competent theory under a given scenario should direct contract enforcement.  Just as 
Scott’s characterization suggests a humbler position for the judiciary, this eclectic 
approach belies its own theoretical modesty: there is no silver bullet here.  The best that 
can be done is to cobble together a menu of philosophies and muddle through as best as 
possible.   
One might reasonably ask whether such an approach can have a coherent purpose 
and, if not, whether the entire edifice then crumbles without a raison d’être.  It is not 
without the realm of possibility.  It may not be possible to determine whether this 
approach serves either of contract law’s two standard values, efficiency or fairness.  
Perhaps it is both efficient and fair to follow pragmatist principles when enforcing 
contracts.  Perhaps not.  This pragmatic approach to collaboration does clearly serve one 
value, however, which has gone unnoticed until recently: solidarity.  I.e. this method of 
resolving disputes valorizes, if nothing else, the very community the contract created.  It 
has been argued that such a community is a valid purpose of contract law: “promises 
generally, and contracts in particular, establish a relation of recognition and respect—and 
indeed a kind of community—among those who participate in them, and… the reasons 
that exist for making and for keeping promises and contracts [can be understood] in terms 
of the value of this relation.”320  In other words, relationships are ends, not just means to 
individuated satisfaction.321  This idea of “respectful community”322—or, in other words, 
solidarity—provides an ethical justification for the pragmatist approach.   
 
                                                 
320 Markovits, “Contract and Collaboration,” 113 Yale L. J. 1417, 1418 (2004)(“the value of community [is 
found] directly in the form of the contract relation rather than in any substantive ends that the parties to 
contracts pursue.”) 
321 Markovits makes this point relying upon Kantian reasoning.  Id. at 1420. 
322 Id. 
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VI. Summary and Ramifications 
 This paper has outlined a new theory of contract law.  After observing the new 
forms of economic organization that have emerged in the last quarter of the 20th Century, 
the paper, in response to the inability of scholars of both economics and law to theorize 
the new economy, sketched an alternative theory of incomplete contracting.  Central to 
this alternative theory is the idea of endogenous uncertainty, a condition where parties are 
unable to ascertain their preferences because of their own innovations.  To explain how 
parties collaborate while awash in such fundamental uncertainty, Sabel’s theory of 
pragmatic governance was employed.  Evidence in the form of contemporary contracts 
between new economy collaborators justified the invocation of learning by monitoring.  
Finally, enforcement in the form of self-enforcement and external adjudication was 
explored, and the paper argued that traditional contextualist enforcement (a la the UCC 
and 2nd Restatement) was inappropriate for these new pragmatic governance mechanisms.  
That concluded the paper’s positive section. 
 The paper’s normative argument is that pragmatic governance mechanisms 
demand pragmatic enforcement.  Thus, the learning by monitoring principles of 
benchmarking, simultaneous engineering, and error detection and correction provide a 
means for courts to enforce these contracts’ flexible terms.  However, these contracts’ 
concrete terms, such as entry and exit rules, should be interpreted formalistically.  
Formalistic interpretation, useful within its domain, also gives the courts a penalty 
default: if the collaborators do not cooperate with the court’s experimentalist approach, 
the contract’s core, flexible terms will go unenforced.  Parties facing such a prospect will 
play the experimentalist game with the court.  Thus, the court should require by default 
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that collaborators participate in court-annexed ADR and then monitor the parties progress 
by following experimentalist principles.  This eclectic theoretical mix creates a 
governance mechanism capable of redirecting those innovative collaborations threatening 
to founder on the rocks of short-term opportunism.   Self-conscious on account of its 
pragmatist foundation, this theory nevertheless finds ambition in its modesty: it argues 
for a wide-ranging (though, arguably, already underway) reform in judicial enforcement 
of commercial contracts.   
 Realizing this institutional change is possible due to the pace and scope of the 
reform agenda.  First, the pace will be natural because implementation of this agenda 
would be governed by judicial discretion and tempered by parties’ continuing ability to 
determine the rules governing their disputes.  Second, the scope of the reform is 
achievable: although this is arguably a “new” theory of contract, it is one that does not 
entirely displace the old theory.  I.e. contextualist contract enforcement will still be good 
law—it will simply be law limited in application to the world’s non-collaborative deals.  
As the number of these deals dwindles, a likelihood the aggregate results in Section III 
above suggest, a smooth transition should occur.  It will be institutional change a la 
denouement rather than upheaval. 
 
